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IS THE “ARISING UNDER” JURISDICTIONAL
GRANT IN ARTICLE III SELF-EXECUTING?

David R. Dow*

INTRODUCTION
Article III of the U.S. Constitution states the judicial power of the United States
“shall” extend to certain categories of cases.1 Despite that mandatory language,
numerous commentators and the handful of judges who have addressed the issue
have agreed for centuries that the federal courts have only the jurisdiction Congress
gives them.2 This consensus bridges both time and ideology, yet I will argue this
widespread agreement rests on a faulty understanding of constitutional history. The
conventional wisdom, though long-held, is wrong. Properly understood, the federal
courts obtain their power to hear cases directly from the Constitution itself, without
the need for congressional enabling.
In part, the conventional wisdom relies on the language of the first Judiciary Act
of 1789, which vested the federal courts with rather limited jurisdiction.3 By and
large, Congress expected even those litigants with actions grounded in federal law
to seek redress initially in state courts.4 The existing federal courts did not register
any disagreement with Congress, perhaps because the occasion to do so did not arise.
Additionally, Congress did not vest the federal courts with wide-ranging federal
question jurisdiction until after the Civil War.5 The first Civil Rights Act and its successors began an era where the scope of federal jurisdiction to adjudicate federal
rights violations consistently expanded, and this expansion was paralleled by the
* Cullen Professor, University of Houston Law Center; Rorschach Visiting Professor of
History, Rice University. Many colleagues and students have helped me over several years
to develop and refine the thesis of this Article. I thank especially Paul Mansur, Walt
Cubberly, and Caite Tanner. Valuable research support, for which I am grateful, was provided by Dean Leonard Baynes, Associate Dean Marcilynn Burke, and the University of
Houston Law Foundation.
1
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2
See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitations
on “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309, 312 (2007) (“The federal judicial power
created in Article III is not self-executing, and Congress must vest it in the lower federal courts
by statute.”).
3
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85.
4
See id. See generally PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 960–61 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER];
FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 64 (1928).
5
See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction,
36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 913 (1984).
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broadening of jurisdiction elsewhere. Finally, the Judiciary Act of 1875 gave the federal
circuit courts, subject to a $500 amount in controversy requirement, concurrent
jurisdiction over “all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity . . . arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their authority”6—in other words, “arising under” jurisdiction. Since
that time, the history of “arising under” jurisdiction has been a history of expansion
and contraction as Congress has reacted to the litigation trends spawned by the
existing enabling legislation.7
Two propositions have however, remained constant: first, that in the absence of
a statutory grant, the federal courts do not possess general federal-question jurisdiction; and second, that the scope of “arising under” jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331 is
narrower than the allowable scope of such jurisdiction under Article III.8 Case law and
scholarly commentary treat the language of Article III, Section 2 as the outer boundary
of what Congress may do, but Congress is regarded as having the power to do less—
i.e., to vest less than the whole of Article III’s “arising under” jurisdiction.9
I argue the first proposition is wrong, which means the second proposition is
wrong a fortiori. Article III, Section 2, paragraph 1 of the U.S. Constitution says that
the judicial power “shall” extend to certain cases.10 “Shall” is a mandatory word, and
6

Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470.
See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 963–66.
8
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 916, 916 (1988) (“By nearly universal consensus, the most
plausible construction of this language would hold that if Congress creates any adjudicative
bodies at all, it must grant them the protections of judicial independence that are contemplated in Article III.”); Freer, supra note 2, at 312 (“In other words, the federal judicial power
created in Article III is not self-executing, and Congress must vest it in the lower federal
courts by statute.”); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial
Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 646 (2004) (“Nearly everyone agrees
that Article III defies literal application.”).
9
See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW 18 (1981); HART
AND WECHSLER, supra note 4; CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3562, at 73–81 (3d ed. 2008); Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards
of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 870, 870–71 (2011); John Harrison, The Power
of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 203, 204 (1997); Ronald D. Rotunda, Congressional Power to Restrict the
Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts and the Problem of School Bussing, 64 GEO. L.J.
839, 839–40 (1976). Professor Ritz’s explanation of the failure of the Judiciary Act of 1789
to vest the Court with the entirety of its Article III power is that the Federalists in control of
Congress were seeking to appease the anti-Federalists. WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE
HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 (1990). That Article III reflects a compromise
between Federalists and anti-Federalists is a proposition I do not dispute, but the further
conclusion that this compromise also involved a decision that federal jurisdiction not be selfexecuting is not supported by the historical record. See also infra note 22.
10
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
7
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it was a mandatory word when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.11 Conventional wisdom nevertheless holds that the constitutional grant of “arising under”
jurisdiction to federal courts in Article III, Section 2 requires enabling legislation;12
conventional wisdom thereby treats the word “shall” as if it means “may.” This
conventional wisdom rests on a misreading of the historical record. As I will show,
federal question jurisdiction flows directly from the Constitution to duly created
federal courts. As a result, regardless of what action Congress takes (or fails to take),
the Supreme Court possesses all the jurisdiction identified by the constitutional grant
in Article III, Section 2; and it has possessed that jurisdiction since the Constitution
was ratified.
Congress does have discretion with respect to the creation of lower federal
courts;13 however, as I will also show, if Congress chooses to create them, the inferior federal courts acquire all the jurisdiction the Constitution allots from the
moment of their creation, and they continue to possess that full scope of jurisdiction
for so long as they exist.
If the statute that vests the federal courts with federal question jurisdiction were
deemed to reach the outer limit of what the Constitution permits,14 the argument I
make here might be entirely arcane. However, because the statutory jurisdictional
grant has been deemed consistently to be narrower than the constitutional grant,15
the argument is in fact consequential, and the implication of my claim is that many
decisions deeming some federal questions to lie outside the allotted jurisdiction of
11

See, e.g., AKHIL R. AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 236 (2005) (“In
the Article III vesting clause and roster, ‘shall’ and ‘all’ meant what they said.”); RANDY E.
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 178–79
(2004). For a somewhat more nuanced view—which does not dispute directly that “shall”
is a mandatory word in the context of Article III—see Nora Rotter Tillman & Seth Barrett
Tillman, A Fragment on Shall and May, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 453, 454–56 (2008–2010)
(warning against so-called presentism—i.e., believing without evidence that contemporary
meaning of words was also their meaning in 1780). For a discussion of the relevance of the
word “shall” to whether treaties are self-executing, see Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing
Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 760–64 (1988). See also generally Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1995) (discussing
the ability of individuals to enforce the Constitution without state law and the role of the
courts in enforcing the Constitution).
12
“The judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This clause is conventionally known as
creating so-called “arising under” federal question jurisdiction. I refer to this jurisdiction as
“arising under” jurisdiction.
13
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
14
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
15
See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1569, 1638 (1990); see also HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 4; Freer, supra note 2, at
312–13; Grove, supra note 9.
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the federal courts are wrong. Put differently, to the extent the argument laid out here
is sound, federal jurisdiction extends to a far broader universe of disputes than existing jurisdictional doctrine allows.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT
Self-executing powers flow directly from the Constitution.16 In general, both
congressional and presidential powers are self-executing. For example, the President
may issue pardons without the requirement of any congressional action.17 Congress
may coin money without executive involvement.18 Congress can even enact laws
without presidential acquiescence if two-thirds of the members of each house vote
to override the President’s veto.19 I argue here that the power of Article III that gives
courts the power to hear cases that arise under the Constitution or the laws of the
United States (i.e., federal question jurisdiction) is also self-executing.20 The power
flows to the judicial branch directly from the language of the Constitution itself.
I of course recognize that, in putting forth this argument, I am taking issue with
a piece of conventional wisdom that has endured for many years. The orthodox view
holds that the power of the federal courts to hear federal question cases depends
upon Congress’s enactment of enabling legislation.21 This view is based on a single
historical fact, taken out of context.22 But as I will show, the totality of the available
historical evidence fits more harmoniously with the conclusion that the power of the
judicial branch, like that of the President and the Congress, must be understood to
be self-executing.
16

See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 11; Paust, supra note 11, at 760–61.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
18
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
19
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
20
My argument is strictly limited to original federal question jurisdiction, and I therefore
do not discuss ancillary (or pendent) jurisdiction, nor do I address related doctrines, including
removal jurisdiction or the well-pleaded complaint rule.
21
See, e.g., Paul Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1030–32 (1982) (discussing the purpose of Article VII and the power
of Congress in connection with the judiciary).
22
As I discuss below, the key proponent to focus on this fact—that Congress did not
statutorily vest the federal courts with “arising under” jurisdiction until 1875—as the pivotal
fact regarding the relationship between congressional and judicial power with respect to
federal jurisdiction is probably Paul Bator. See generally id. (arguing that Article III’s constitutional intention is extremely clear in regard to congressional power to govern federal
judiciary power). Professor Gunther was also an influential proponent of this view. See
Gunther, supra note 5, at 912–13. To some extent, the premise of this argument in favor of
congressional control is the supposed “distinction between judicial power and jurisdiction.”
See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION ANNOTATIONS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES TO JUNE 30, 1952,
at 511 (Edward S. Corwin ed., 1953) [hereinafter Corwin]. My argument disputes the coherence of this ostensible distinction.
17
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As always in such analyses, the place to begin is with the text itself. Article III,
Section 2 reads in part: “The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and
equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their authority . . . .”23 Notwithstanding this
language, however, the question of whether a federal court possesses jurisdiction
over a particular dispute is currently resolved not by examining the constitutional
text directly, but instead by interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides: “The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”24
Historically, the strongest argument supporting the orthodox view is that although
sections 2 and 3 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (i.e., the first Judiciary Act) divided the
nation into thirteen judicial districts and created a federal district court in each district,
it was not until the 1875 amendments to the Act that Congress created the predecessor
to the current § 1331.25 In other words, it took nearly a century of our nation’s existence before Congress statutorily vested the “arising under” jurisdiction in the federal
courts.26 So, the argument goes, the fact Congress waited so long to vest this jurisdiction in the federal courts must prove that Congress could choose to do so or not.
Once it is assumed that whether the federal courts possess this jurisdiction turns
on what Congress has done (rather than on what the Constitution says), then the
breadth of “arising under” jurisdiction depends on the statutory language and congressional intent, rather than the constitutional text. And even though the language of the
statute is essentially the same as the constitutional text, ever since the first version of the
“arising under” statute was enacted, the language of § 1331 has been deemed to be
narrower than the nearly identical language of Article III.27 Consequently, because
§ 1331 has not been deemed to be coterminous with the constitutional language—i.e.,
because the statute has been deemed to confer a narrower jurisdictional reach than
is permissible under the Constitution—my argument, if sound, entails that the federal
23

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). On the supposed difference between jurisdiction and power,
see Corwin, supra note 22, at 511–12.
25
See Bator, supra note 21, at 1031–32.
26
In addition to the historical weakness of this argument, which I address in detail below,
the argument’s very factual predicate is also probably wrong. As Professor Engdahl has
persuasively argued, the Judiciary Act of 1789 can indeed be understood as having vested
all the jurisdiction Article III allows. See David E. Engdahl, Federal Question Jurisdiction
Under the Article III Judiciary Act, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 521, 521–22 (1989). I should
emphasize, however, that Professor Engdahl also endorsed the conventional wisdom that
congressional enabling legislation is required.
27
See, e.g., Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 584 (1949)
(describing Court decisions about the rights of individuals in the District of Columbia and
whether such individuals were considered “citizen(s) of a state” under the Judiciary Act of
1789); see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493–94 (1983);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 515 (1969); Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 379 n.51 (1959).
24

6

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1

courts have a significant reservoir of power they have been anxious not to assume
and of which they cannot be constitutionally deprived.
In arguing here that the conventional understanding of the relationship between the
constitutional and statutory texts is wrong, I make two independent claims. The stronger
claim is that powers identified in Article III are self-executing with respect to the only
court created directly by the Constitution: the Supreme Court. Accordingly, no congressional action is required in order for the Supreme Court to have the power to exercise
jurisdiction (either original or appellate) over all the cases identified in Article III.28
The second, weaker, claim is that the judicial power of the lower courts is also selfexecuting. Although Congress may not be required to create lower courts, once Congress does so, those courts immediately and necessarily possess the power to hear
all cases that arise under federal law, and that power cannot be diluted or withdrawn
by Congress.29 Thus, the Supreme Court has possessed the power to hear so-called
federal question cases from the moment the Constitution was ratified; district courts
(and courts of appeals) have held this power from the moment that Congress, acting
pursuant to the Exceptions Clause of Article III, created them.30 The former claim is
stronger simply because the historical evidence supporting it is clearer, but the second
weaker claim is also sound, even though the historical evidence surrounding it is
somewhat mixed.31
The argument proceeds as follows: In Part II, I show how deeply rooted in
jurisdictional doctrine the modern orthodoxy is, and I identify three related propositions embedded in that orthodoxy: that most exercises of federal jurisdiction require
enabling legislation; that, in the absence of enabling legislation, federal courts lack
the power to act; and that a federal court’s power to act is defined by, and limited
to, the enabling legislation. In Part III, I turn to the historical underpinnings of the
current orthodoxy, in part to reveal how the historical evidence does not in fact
support the weight that the modern view places on it. Finally, in Part IV, I lay out
the argument for self-execution by examining the historical evidence anew, including records of the Constitutional Convention, the records from the state ratifying
conventions, and the structure of the Constitution as a whole.
28

Some support for this stronger claim can be found in Professor Pfander’s examination
of the Framers’ attitude with respect to the power of the Supreme Court. See James E.
Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1518–19 (2001).
29
Cf. Grove, supra note 9, at 888–915 (noting history of expansion and contraction of
federal jurisdiction owing to congressional control).
30
This conclusion obviously entails that the Supreme Court errs when it reads § 1331 (the
statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction) more narrowly than it reads the Constitution.
31
My argument has not gone entirely unnoticed. Concurring in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Justice Harlan took note of the theory which
holds “that a court’s power to enjoin invasion of constitutionally protected interests derives
directly from the Constitution.” 403 U.S. 388, 405 n.5 (1971). But neither Justice Harlan, nor
any other, has endorsed that theory. Id. at 404. In the following pages, I argue in favor of the
broad version of the theory referred to, but in the end avoided, by Justice Harlan.
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II. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DEPTH OF THE CURRENT ORTHODOXY
Current orthodoxy holds that Congress has significant, even controlling, power
over federal court jurisdiction.32 This orthodoxy dominates both the case law as well
as the academy. A typical expression of this idea occurs in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,33 where the Supreme Court observed that “arising under”
jurisdiction is not self-executing and that “it was not until the Judiciary Act of 1875
that Congress gave the federal courts general federal-question jurisdiction.”34 The
implication of this observation is that, until Congress vested the jurisdiction in the
federal courts, the federal courts did not possess it.
The academic endorsement of this same orthodoxy was popularized by Professor Hart, who argued that Congress’s power under the so-called Exceptions Clause35
is so vast that the only limitation on Congress’s power to define the scope of the
federal courts’ jurisdiction is the will of the voters.36 On this limited point, the
scholarly consensus overwhelmingly endorses Hart’s contention.37 The modern
view, therefore, is that Congress has the authority to direct the flow of jurisdiction
among courts (whether state or federal, trial or appellate),38 as well as the far more
significant power to determine whether a cause of action ostensibly within the
constitutional grant of federal jurisdiction will be capable of being heard in federal
court at all. In short, the modern view is that the constitutionally granted judicial
32

See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 8–12 (1983)
(discussing federal court original jurisdiction over claims that concern state law); Bivens, 403
U.S. at 607 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (characterizing the view that the Article III jurisdictional grant is not self-executing as “elementary doctrine”); Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 337 U.S.
at 607; HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that the congressional control
orthodoxy traced back to the framing of the Constitution). See generally supra note 9.
33
478 U.S. 804 (1986).
34
Id. at 807–10.
35
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that “with such exceptions and under such
regulations as the Congress shall make”).
36
See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1399 (1953) (“In the end we have
to depend on Congress for the effective functioning of our judicial system, and perhaps for
any functioning. The primary check on Congress is the political check—the votes of the
people. If Congress wants to frustrate the judicial check, our constitutional tradition requires
that it be made to say so unmistakably, so that the people will understand and the political
check can operate.”).
37
See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided
Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 854 (1984)
[hereinafter Clinton, A Guided Quest].
38
See, e.g., id. at 749–54 (“[T]he so-called exceptions and regulations clause . . . to create
inferior federal courts were intended by the framers to be construed in conformity with the
overriding objective of the judicial article—to ensure that some federal court would have at
least a discretionary opportunity to review each class of case enumerated in section 2 of
article III . . . .”). See generally supra note 9.
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power to hear cases must flow first through the filter of the political branch before
arriving at its judicial destination.39
Not surprisingly, the view that Congress has significant power to limit federal
jurisdiction is not entirely unconnected to the constitutional text. Two provisions of
Article III confer specific yet limited powers on Congress. One of them, referred to
briefly above (i.e., the so-called Exceptions Clause), provides as follows:
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases
before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact; with such exceptions, and under
such regulations as the Congress shall make.40
In addition, Article III, Section 1 grants Congress the power either to create or to
decline to create lower federal courts.41 The text provides: “The judicial power of
the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”42
Finally, Article I explicitly grants to Congress the power referred to in the first
section of Article III; there the text provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o
constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court[.]”43
39

See, e.g., Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 749–54 (stating that achieving the
goal of uniform interpretation of laws was, for the most part, “left substantially to congressional discretion”). Of course, the exact contours of Congress’s power over federal
courts as the jurisdictional grants flow through its domain are far from clear, and a great
many commentators have endeavored to discern to what extent Congress may constitutionally control federal court jurisdiction. See, e.g., id. at 741–42 (stating that the “meaning
of article III is not only far from evident, but has been made positively murky by judicial and
scholarly misinterpretation”). But see Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S.
582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating that few provisions of the Constitution
are “more explicit and specific than those pertaining to the courts established under Article III”).
The literature analyzing this topic is vast and demonstrates a broad diversity of opinion. See
also Akhil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 206–10 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, A Neo-Federalist
View] (putting forth Amar’s neo-federalist view and mapping the remainder of the article);
Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 742 n.3 (listing commentaries prior to 1984).
Compare Bator, supra note 21, at 1030 (providing a very strong argument in favor of Congress’s jurisdictional power), with Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict
Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 504–13 (1974) (providing a very limited
version of Congress’s jurisdictional power).
40
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
41
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
42
Id.
43
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The same section includes the Necessary and Proper Clause, which
provides that Congress has the power “[t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
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Yet, despite Article III’s clear creation of some congressional power over the federal courts, none of these provisions expressly or manifestly allows Congress to reduce
the total quantum of constitutionally conferred federal jurisdiction. What, then, is the
source of the modern orthodoxy that maintains that Congress may do precisely that?
The prevalent theory rests on a commonly invoked hermeneutic: the idea that
the greater power logically includes the lesser.44 The argument goes roughly as follows:
because Congress has the power to decline to create courts altogether, it must therefore also have the lesser power to create them while strictly controlling their jurisdiction. Further, and similarly, Congress’s power to create exceptions and regulations to
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction must include the power to refuse to vest
the Court with all the constitutionally identified jurisdiction. Or, put somewhat differently, because the lower federal courts depend for their very existence on acts of
Congress, Congress can, when creating those courts, also precisely define their power.
In other contexts, of course, both courts and commentators have rejected the
idea that the constitutional allocation of a given power to one branch carries with it
all of the logically subsumed lesser powers.45 Thus, for example, although Congress
can choose either to create executive agencies or not to create them, it cannot create
them while also maintaining for itself a so-called legislative veto over their actions.46
Similarly, Congress can authorize the executive to appoint inferior federal officers,
but Congress cannot thereafter control the executive’s power to remove them.47 Yet
this same idea that has been rejected in other contexts persists with regard to
congressional power over federal jurisdiction; and although, as one might suppose,
the scholarly elaboration of this view is often nuanced and careful, it never strays
far from the foundation that the greater power includes the lesser.48
For example, Professor Bator argued that Congress’s power flows logically from
the Philadelphia Convention compromise, first proposed by James Madison49 (and
therefore commonly known as the Madisonian Compromise), which established the
important idea that constitutional principle should not determine the structure or
power of inferior federal courts, but that such questions should instead be left to
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” Id.
44
See Bator, supra note 21, at 1030–31.
45
See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957–59 (1983).
46
See id. at 956–59 (explaining that to take legislative action Congress must abide by the
procedures set forth in the Constitution, rather than imply congressional authority).
47
E.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926); In re Hennen,
38 U.S. 230, 260–61 (1839). All of which discuss the appointment and removal power of the
President and the extent of its limitation.
48
Further, as I discuss below, it may also be a mistake to view the power to allocate
jurisdiction as a lesser power contained in the power to create federal courts—the former
power might well be greater. Cf. Rotunda, supra note 9, at 842–43.
49
See Bator, supra note 21, at 1030; Gunther, supra note 5, at 912.
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“political and legislative judgment.”50 Bator cites as authority for his compromise
thesis the Hart and Wechsler treatise, of which he was an editor.51 This treatise stated,
without any further support, that it “seems to be a necessary inference from the express
decision that the creation of inferior federal courts was to rest in the discretion of Congress that the scope of their jurisdiction, once created, was also to be discretionary.”52
Of course, this assertion from the estimable Hart and Wechsler text does nothing
more than restate the presumption; it is therefore perfectly question-begging. Moreover, as I show below, such evidence as there is of original intent on this question
reveals that the Framers themselves did not believe Congress would enjoy the power
Bator seems to have believed those same Framers placed in the legislative branch.53
Nevertheless, despite being both question-begging and contradicted by the
weight of the available historical evidence, Bator’s view undoubtedly represents the
scholarly consensus. Most academic commentary therefore assumes, either expressly or implicitly, that virtually all federal jurisdiction is discretionary—i.e.,
Congress can either confer or withhold it.54
There are, to be sure, some prominent commentators who depart from this
consensus, but even they do so only partially. Professors Eisenberg and Sager, for
example, have argued that other provisions of the Constitution (and, perhaps, the
very structure of the Constitution itself) impose limits on Congress’s exercise of this
power;55 and at least two other scholars, including Professors Amar and Clinton, have
rejected at least a portion of this conventional wisdom and argued that Congress must
vest some or all of the federal judicial power in federal courts.56
50

Bator, supra note 21, at 1030; Gunther, supra note 5, at 912. In fact, as I argue more
fully below, Professor Bator reads into the Madisonian Compromise more than is actually
appropriate. Nowhere in the debates over whether Congress would have the power to create
inferior courts was the grand principle he relies on explicitly discussed or expounded.
51
See Bator, supra note 21, at 1030 n.2.
52
See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 11.
53
See Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 766 (“It seems, therefore, that the
framers did not assume that with the power to establish inferior federal courts necessarily
went the power to control their jurisdiction.”); id. at 779–82 (providing a theory of the originally
intended meaning of the Exceptions Clause); see also Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword:
Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 32–34 (1981) (discussing attempts to place restrictions on
Congress’s power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction).
54
See Fallon, supra note 8, at 916; Freer, supra note 2, at 312; Pfander, supra note 8, at 646.
55
See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 518–30; Sager, supra note 53, at 37–42. Of
course, all these commentators work from the basic premise that Congress’s jurisdictional
power is discretionary. In addition, as I discuss below, an examination of how the Scottish
judiciary behaved in the late eighteenth century may also lend support to the idea the Framers
expected federal courts to exercise the same strength and independence as Scottish courts.
See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1613, 1615 (2011).
56
See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 39, at 206–10 (arguing that the jurisdictional power is mandatory for federal question, admiralty, and public ambassador cases);
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To summarize, then: under the current conventional wisdom, a federal court
must locate its power to hear a federal question case in both the Constitution and a
statute.57 If the lower, more limited, statutory source is lacking, the court does not
have subject matter jurisdiction, regardless of whether the constitutional language
itself appears to create it.
III. THE ORIGIN OF THE CURRENT ORTHODOXY
As I have suggested, the essence of the argument that enabling legislation is
required in order to implement the Article III jurisdictional grant is a form of “the
greater includes the lesser.” Different scholars have traced this simple argument to
different historical periods. Professor Engdahl, for example, traces it to the second
generation after the founding, noting that the first Congress vested the whole of the
constitutionally allotted “arising under” jurisdiction.58 In other words, in Engdahl’s
view, the proposition that Congress could control the jurisdiction allotted to the
federal courts grew more potent over time. In contrast, Professor Harwood has suggested that the presumption that “arising under” jurisdiction is not self-executing
had its birth in the Judiciary Act of 1789 itself and was already fully formed when
the Constitution was ratified.59
Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 749–54 (arguing that the entirety of federal court
jurisdiction is mandatory). Even Professor Amar’s so-called mandatory thesis, however, the
most radical (and creative) proposal in the area of federal jurisdiction in half a century,
accepts unquestioningly, as does the more conventional so-called discretionary theory, that
some act of Congress is required before a federal court may act upon a case within its
constitutionally delineated jurisdiction.
57
After the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1875 granting federal courts general “arising
under” jurisdiction, the Court was confused about the extent of the statutory grant. See
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 90–98 (4th ed. 1983); see also HART
AND WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 960–66, 995–97 (discussing statutory jurisdiction and the
effect of the Judiciary Act of 1875 on tracking the constitutional “arising under” language).
Interpretations did not easily distinguish between the Constitution and the statute. See
WRIGHT, supra, at 92–93. It was not until later that the dichotomy emerged, and the Court
interpreted the statute as conferring a narrower grant of “arising under” jurisdiction. See
WRIGHT, supra, at 90–98; see also HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 960–66, 995–97.
58
Engdahl, supra note 26, at 536 n.74 (“The impression that discretion to divest
jurisdiction once it has been vested flows a fortiori from the discretion given Congress to
constitute ‘inferior’ courts traces only to the second generation under the Constitution.”).
Professor Engdahl concludes that the first Congress vested the entire “arising under”
jurisdiction with the Judiciary Act of 1789. Id. at 521. However, his thesis clearly rests on
the congressional control presumption; that is, in his view, Congress could have declined to
vest the federal courts with this jurisdiction.
59
See, e.g., Anthony J. Harwood, Note, A Narrow Eleventh Amendment Immunity for
Political Subdivisions: Reconciling the Arm of the State Doctrine with Federalism Principles,
55 FORDHAM L. REV. 101, 111 n.80 (1986) (stating that “the first Congress established the
principle that under article III Congress has the discretion to grant or withhold original
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In point of fact, neither Engdahl nor Harwood is precisely correct. The available
historical record points to a very different conclusion: namely, the presumption that
an act of Congress is required in order for federal courts to possess jurisdiction over
cases that arise under the Constitution developed much later in our constitutional
history than the conventional wisdom assumes—the Framers themselves did not hold
this view; and it developed largely as an outgrowth of judicial dereliction of duty.
A. The Judiciary Act of 1789
The first edition of the venerable Hart and Wechsler casebook asserted that the
“judiciary article of the Constitution was not self-executing”; and the authors supported this claim by pointing to the first Congress’s passage of the Judiciary Act of
1789.60 Charles Allan Wright’s treatise on federal jurisdiction expresses the same
view.61 These are legendary scholars, but their shared conclusion rests on two related
observations—both of which, when examined, turn out to be far less probative than
the conventional wisdom allows.
The first observation is that the first Congress was made up of many of the
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention.62 The second is that the first Congress did
not expressly vest all the jurisdiction contained within the constitutional grant.63 The
conclusion said to follow is that because the members of the first Congress, many
of whom were also involved in the framing of the Constitution, passed the first
Judiciary Act, that proves that they believed that the Act was necessary; and if the
Act was necessary, the judicial power cannot be self-executing.
The two underlying factual observations are correct, of course, but the syllogism
built on top of them is infirm, for the issue is not whether the Act was necessary. To
some extent it clearly was: an act of Congress, for example, was needed to create
those federal courts that Congress has the power either to create or not to create.
Nevertheless, the power to create courts does not necessarily carry with it the power
to control their jurisdiction. Moreover, a closer look at the debate over the first
Judiciary Act reveals that the members of Congress who argued in favor of congressional limitation on jurisdiction may have been thinking less about whether the
jurisdictional grant was self-executing and more about fighting a rear-guard action
federal question jurisdiction”); see also Fallon, supra note 8, at 916; Freer, supra note 2, at
312; Pfander, supra note 8, at 646.
60
See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 30–31; Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View
of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation of and Departures from the Constitutional
Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1523–24 (1986) [hereinafter Clinton, Early Implementation].
61
WRIGHT, supra note 57, at 90–98.
62
But see Clinton, Early Implementation, supra note 60, at 1524–27 (showing that the
first Congress was not so predominated by the supporters of the Constitution in the Philadelphia
Convention and in the ratification debates as believed).
63
But see id. at 1523 (“[S]upporters of the Judiciary Act of 1789 thought they had vested
all of the constitutionally authorized ‘judicial power of the United States’ in the federal
judiciary . . . .”); Engdahl, supra note 26, at 522–24.
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to preserve the power of the state governments vis-à-vis the newly created national
one. In short, there were many in the first Congress who unquestionably viewed the
jurisdictional grant as self-executing, and the fact they voted in favor of the first
Judiciary Act does not reveal that they backed away from that position.64
Perhaps the most important point to stress about the first Judiciary Act is that,
like nearly all legislation, it was a compromise measure, and both those who supported it and those who opposed it had different understandings of its significance.
For the moment, the point of disagreement I want to explore in connection with the
statute involves whether members of Congress believed that federal jurisdiction was
self-executing (as opposed to, for example, whether Congress was obligated to create
lower federal courts), and regardless, how they understood the power of Congress
to control or limit the federal judicial power.65
The Bill originated in the Senate. Oliver Ellsworth was its primary draftsman,
and there is evidence he believed district courts and courts of appeal would possess
only the jurisdiction Congress allotted to them.66 In contrast, an anonymous letter
published in several newspapers in the summer of 1789 depicted a much more
powerful judicial department—one where the federal circuit courts were to “take cognizance of all cases of Federal Jurisdiction, whether in law and equity above the value
of 500 dollars (inferior matters to be left to the State Courts), and of all criminal
cases not within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Judges.”67 The same theme was
articulated by Pennsylvania Senator William Maclay, who explained: “the Constitution expressly extended [federal jurisdiction] to all cases, in law and equity, under
the Constitution and laws of the United States; treaties made or to be made, etc. We
already had existing treaties, and were about making many laws. These must be
executed by the Federal judiciary.”68
Professor Warren argues that the anonymous letters outlining a robust federal
judicial power—the same view Senator Maclay subsequently expressed—reflected
64

See, e.g., Clinton, Early Implementation, supra note 60, at 1523–24.
Because there are records of the House debates, but not of the Senate debates, there is
far more documentary evidence as to what members of the House thought, but I know of no reason to suspect the views of senators would have been significantly different. The best sources
are chapter three (“The Judiciary Bill”) of Maclay’s Journal, JOURNAL OF WILLIAM S. MACLAY
85–133 (Edgar S. Maclay ed., A.M. 1890), http://www.constitution.org/ac/maclay/journal
.htm [https://perma.cc/MGN7-ZR6V] [hereinafter MACLAY], and Charles Warren, New Light
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923).
66
Warren, supra note 65, at 60–61.
67
Id. at 61 n.29. The letter added:
In cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the plaintiff may sue either in the State
or Federal Court, but having made his option, he shall abide by it. A
defendant sued in a State Court, in a matter of federal jurisdiction, may
remove the cause to the Federal Court before trial but will not be
allowed to appeal.
Id.
68
MACLAY, supra note 65, at 85.
65
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the early stages of the draft bill.69 Obviously, the final bill was different, and Warren
concludes that the less robust final product “undoubtedly represent[s] the price
which Ellsworth paid to secure the concurrence of Richard Henry Lee in reporting
the Bill.”70 As Warren describes the warring factions in the Congress, one faction
“took the position that Congress had no power to withhold from the Federal Courts
which it should establish any of the judicial power granted by the Constitution”
while the other believed federal questions could be addressed by “the State Courts,
in the first instance[.]”71 Viewed through this prism, the question of self-execution
embodied the classic federalist-versus-anti-federalist theme of how to allocate power
between the federal and state sovereigns.72
If the congressional debate over the Act itself proves something of an impasse,
other parallel actions and debates are somewhat more revealing. In particular, in the
House, among the seventeen proposed constitutional amendments offered by Representative Samuel Livermore were several that would have dramatically weakened
the federal courts. Initially he wanted to prevent Congress from even creating lower
courts with broad jurisdiction, and so he proposed limiting Congress’s power under
Article I, Section 8, clause 9; instead of having broad authority to constitute inferior
tribunals, Livermore argued Congress should be able to do nothing more than
constitute courts of admiralty.73 Livermore’s efforts obviously failed,74 but they
nonetheless appear to reflect his assessment that many of his colleagues viewed the
jurisdictional grant as self-executing, and the only way to keep the federal courts
from exercising that power, therefore, was not to create them.
The attitude Livermore’s proposed amendments aimed to counter was epitomized
perhaps by South Carolina Congressman William Smith, who opposed efforts like
Livermore’s to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts by quoting the language
of the Constitution itself. Speaking of Article III, Representative Smith observed:
It is declared by that instrument that the judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme, and in such inferior courts as Congress shall from time to time establish. Here is
no discretion, then, in Congress to vest the judicial power of the
United States in any other than the Supreme Court and the inferior courts of the United States. It is further declared that the
69

Warren, supra note 65, at 61–62.
Id. at 62.
71
Id. at 67.
72
Viewing the debate over the Judiciary Act as a sort of proxy fight over the broader
question of state versus federal power is a theme that has been laid out in detail by, among
others, Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 849–50, and Engdahl, supra note 26, at
532 (discussing federal judiciary jurisdiction over private federal law claims).
73
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 796–97 (Joseph Gales, Sr. ed., 1834) [hereinafter CONGRESS].
74
Id. at 834.
70
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judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases of a
particular description. How is that power to be administered?
Undoubtedly by the tribunals of the United States; if the judicial
power of the United States extends to those specified cases, it
follows indisputably that the tribunals of the United States must
likewise extend to them.75
To be sure, the debate was contentious, and there were many members who believed
Congress did indeed have power to limit federal jurisdiction, but the evidence demonstrates two propositions unequivocally: first, that many in the first Congress believed
Congress was without power to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts because
it had already been provided for by the Constitution; and second, that many, if not
most, who took a contrary view did so not because they believed the Article III power
was not self-executing, but because they wanted to limit federal power in general in
order to preserve state power.76
Moreover, it is possible that some members of the first Congress who voted for
the Judiciary Act despite its arguable limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction
did so precisely because they believed any such limits would be deemed unconstitutional. For example, when Elbridge Gerry responded to the prospect of restricting
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts following their creation, he pointed out
that, faced with an attempt to limit their jurisdiction, the lower federal court judges
“would then inquire what were the Judicial powers of the Union, and undertake the
exercise thereof, notwithstanding any Legislative declaration to the contrary; consequently their system would be a nullity, at least, which attempted to restrict the
jurisdiction of inferior courts.”77
Gerry clearly anticipated that inferior federal courts would look directly to the Constitution itself for the purpose of defining their jurisdiction. Consequently, if a statute
restricted federal jurisdiction to less than that provided for by the Constitution, the
75

Id. at 801. The same view was echoed by Egbert Benson of New York, who explained:
“It is not left to the election of the Legislature of the United States whether we adopt or not
a judicial system like the one before us; the words in the constitution are plain and full, and
must be carried into operation.” Id. at 804.
76
Or, as Professor Warren wrote:
[T]he Judiciary Act was a measure in the nature of a compromise between the extreme Federalist view that the full extent of judicial power
granted by the Constitution should be vested by Congress in the Federal Courts, and the view of those who feared the new Government as
a destroyer of the rights of the States, who wished all suits to be
decided first in the State Courts, and only on appeal by the Federal
Supreme Court.
Warren, supra note 65, at 131.
77
CONGRESS, supra note 73, at 829 (discussed in Clinton, Early Implementation, supra
note 60, at 1539).
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federal court could ignore the statute and treat it as an unconstitutional restraint on
the constitutionally defined federal judicial power—a mirror image of the Court’s
decision in Marbury v. Madison78 to forbid Congress from expanding the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what the Constitution conferred.
Madison’s view was essentially the same as Gerry’s. Addressing concerns about
the restrictions provided in the Act, Madison pointed out that they were inconsequential because the judiciary would correct discrepancies between the Act and the
Constitution and thereby render the two texts coterminous.79
Finally, though it is clear that the Framers differed amongst themselves as to
how to allocate power between the federal and state judiciaries, as well as where to
draw the line between judicial independence and congressional control, Madison’s
notes from the Constitutional Convention identify two resolutions the Framers rejected, and those rejections further buttress the conclusion that the majority of the
Framers understood “arising under” jurisdiction to be self-executing.80 First, in debating Article XI of the Committee of Detail’s report concerning the judiciary—what
would become the jurisdictional menu in Article III of the Constitution—the Framers
overwhelmingly rejected a provision that would have been inserted into Article III
following the enumeration of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, perhaps as
an alternative to what became the so-called Exceptions Clause. That rejected language would have provided: “In all the other cases before mentioned the Judicial
power shall be exercised in such manner as the Legislature shall direct[.]”81 Next,
the Convention unanimously deleted a provision that would have given to Congress the
power to “assign any part of the jurisdiction abovementioned (except the trial of the
President of the United States) in the manner, and under the limitations which it
shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute from time to time.”82
In short, notwithstanding the obvious diversity of opinion surrounding the
passage of the first Judiciary Act, the weight of authority regarding the intent of the
Framers themselves is that no congressional action was necessary to vest the federal
courts with the full menu of constitutional “arising under” jurisdiction. Defenders of
the orthodox view, however, make a second historical claim; they argue that the best
78

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
See Clinton, Early Implementation, supra note 60, at 1539.
80
See infra notes 81–82.
81
THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 475–76 (Gallard Hunt & James Brown Scott
eds., 1920) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787]. The Committee of Detail reported
to the convention on August 6, and the debate over the Committee’s proposed judicial article
began thereafter, with attention turning to Article XI of the report—the relevant provision
here—on August 27. Id. at 337, 347–51, 473–76. For a superb examination of the work of
the Committee of Detail, and its relevance to understanding the Framers’ intentions in
general—and with respect to Article III in particular—see William Ewald, The Committee
of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 235–46, 278 (2012).
82
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 476.
79
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argument supporting the conventional wisdom, wholly apart from what the Framers
may have believed, is simply that the first Judiciary Act did not, on its face, fully
vest the constitutionally granted jurisdiction;83 it did not contain a general grant of
“arising under” jurisdiction to the inferior courts.84 Coupled with evidence that
Congress expected much federal question litigation to take place in the state courts,
the argument goes, the decision not to expressly vest the jurisdiction in the lower
federal courts must demonstrate that Congress had the power to limit the jurisdiction
of those lower courts.
This argument, which infers the meaning of Article III based largely on what the
first Congress did, suffers from three primary defects. First, it may well be wrong
as a matter of fact. Professor Engdahl has argued that the first Congress did vest
lower federal courts with the full scope of the “arising under” jurisdiction as to laws
of the United States.85 He focuses on the Act’s grant to district courts of jurisdiction
to entertain “all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the
United States.”86 Engdahl explains that “‘forfeiture’ of a sum as damages to the
claimant was the remedy routinely afforded private persons seeking redress for
injuries claimed to have resulted from other private persons’ violations of federal
laws.”87 In other words, Congress, through this provision, did direct the enforcement
of its laws in federal courts in the first instance through the device of the forfeiture.88
Second, as a logical matter, the argument that focuses on what Congress did is
question-begging, because what Congress did can support either of two competing
conclusions. If Congress believed that it had the power to restrict federal jurisdiction
to less than that specified in the Constitution, then it may well have enacted a statute
like the first Judiciary Act. However, it is also true that if Congress did not believe
it had this power, it might also have enacted a statute just like the first Judiciary Act.
If Congress expected that the courts created pursuant to the Exceptions Clause
would read the Constitution in order to define their jurisdiction, then Congress would
not include a general “arising under” jurisdictional grant in the statute. It would be unnecessary. The language of the first Judiciary Act, therefore, supports either the view
that enabling legislation is required, or the view that legislation is self-executing.
83

But see Akhil F. Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1499, 1515–41 (1990); Clinton, Early Implementation, supra note 60, at 1540–52;
Engdahl, supra note 26, at 522–33.
84
See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 31–33.
85
Engdahl, supra note 26, at 525–29.
86
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
87
Engdahl, supra note 26, at 532.
88
Id. Engdahl’s argument is fully consistent with the self-executing thesis, for the thesis does
not intrude on Congress’s power to determine, at least in part, whether its statutes provide
private rights of action. Professor Engdahl demonstrates that Congress frequently included
jurisdictional provisions with much of the laws it passed in the early years of the nation. Id.
at 533–34 & nn.58–68 (listing legislation). He also makes some interesting observations
about the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1801 and its repeal in 1802. See id. at 535–38.
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Finally, it is significant for purposes of originalist analysis that the first Congress did nothing inconsistent with the self-executing thesis. The proponents of the
Act believed that they were operating within constitutional limitations when they
established the federal judiciary.89 If the “arising under” jurisdiction is indeed selfexecuting, the Act did nothing to interfere with that jurisdictional grant. If the
jurisdictional grant is self-executing, then it is not necessary for Congress to provide
a general jurisdictional grant to the inferior courts. The Act did not specify that the
inferior courts could not exercise jurisdiction over constitutional or federal claims—
something Representative Livermore wanted to say; quite the contrary, the lower
courts were empowered to provide a specific remedy—the remedy of forfeiture—for
the violation of the laws of the United States.90
B. Early Cases Interpreting Article III
A handful of early Supreme Court cases from the founding generation touch on
the question of whether federal jurisdiction flows directly from the Constitution or
whether it requires congressional enabling legislation.91 Like the evidence of the
intentions of the Framers and of the authors of the first Judiciary Act, the data from
the early court cases are mixed. Some dicta support the self-execution thesis; others
suggest the need for congressional action. What is clear is that the language in these
early cases that hinted at strong congressional power ripened in subsequent generations into the present conventional wisdom. It is equally clear, however, that the
contemporary conventional wisdom was far from conventional in the generation
after the founding.
One of the first cases to provide the Supreme Court with an opportunity to
discuss Congress’s power over federal jurisdiction was Wiscart v. Dauchy.92 The
central issue in Wiscart was whether the statement of facts from the circuit court
limited the Supreme Court’s factual inquiry on appeal or whether the Court could
inquire into all the evidence presented at the trial below.93 This question arose
because of a provision in the Judiciary Act allowing appeal of “civil actions” from
the circuit courts to the Supreme Court by means of the writ of error.94 The Supreme
Court had to determine whether “civil actions” included admiralty cases.95 If not, the
89

See Clinton, Early Implementation, supra note 60, at 1540.
Judiciary Act § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77.
91
See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838); M’Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 504 (1813); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812);
Turner v. President of the Bank of N.-Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799); Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796).
92
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796).
93
Id. at 322.
94
Id. at 326 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
95
Id. at 327–29 (opinion of Elsworth [sic], J.).
90
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Judiciary Act did not provide another means by which an appeal could be taken to
the Supreme Court.96 The Court assumed that the Judiciary Act’s language pertaining to civil actions did not include admiralty cases.97 Nevertheless, in an opinion by
Justice Wilson, the Court reasoned that because appeal was a natural course for a
case like this one, the Constitution provided the jurisdictional authority for the Court
to take cognizance of it.98 Further, the power to entertain the appeal included this
power to conduct a full factual inquiry (rather than being limited to the facts from
the court of appeals).99 According to the Court:
It is true, the act of Congress makes no provision on the subject;
but, it is equally true, that the constitution (which we must suppose to be always in the view of the Legislature) had previously
declared that in certain enumerated cases, including admiralty
and maritime cases, “the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and
under such regulations as the Congress shall make.” The appellate jurisdiction, therefore, flowed, as a consequence, from this
source; nor had the Legislature any occasion to do, what the
Constitution had already done. The Legislature might, indeed,
have made exceptions, and introduced regulations upon the
subject; but as it has not done so, the case remains upon the
strong ground of the Constitution, which in general terms, and
on general principles, provides and authori[z]es an appeal; the
process that, in its very nature . . . implies a re-examination of
the fact, as well as the law.100
Although the Court recognized that Congress possessed some power pursuant to the
Exceptions Clause, the Court also understood that the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction flowed directly from the Constitution and did not necessitate enabling
legislation.101 Indeed, Justice Wilson went further, observing “if a positive restriction
[to the Court’s power to entertain appeals over admiralty cases] existed by law, it
would, in my judgment, be superseded by the superior authority of the constitutional
provision.”102
To be sure, Wilson’s view was not unanimous. Justice Ellsworth, for example,
concluded that “[i]f Congress has provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id. at 327 (opinion of Elsworth [sic], J.).
Id. at 330 (opinion of Elsworth [sic], J.).
Id. at 325 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
Id. at 326–27 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
Id. (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis added).
Id. at 326 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
Id. at 325 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
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cannot exercise an appellate jurisdiction; and if the rule is provided, we cannot
depart from it.”103 Ellsworth’s position reveals a dispute among the Founders themselves as to whether federal jurisdiction is self-executing. The debate continued in
several other cases.
Three years after Wiscart, the Court decided Turner v. President of the Bank of
North-America.104 Turner involved the anti-assignment provision of the Judiciary Act
of 1789.105 The Bank had become the assignee of a promissory note made by Turner
in favor of Biddle & Co., a legal resident of the same state as Turner.106 The Bank,
however, enjoyed diverse citizenship with Turner and attempted to bring suit in the
circuit court of North Carolina.107 Counsel for the Bank, William Rawle, argued that
Congress had no power to limit the diversity jurisdiction of the circuit courts because that jurisdiction was guaranteed by the constitutional grant.108 According to
the reporter’s notes, counsel stated:
It is, then, to be remarked that the judicial power, is the grant of the
constitution; and congress can no more limit, than enlarge, the constitutional grant. In the 2d section of the 3d article, the constitution contemplates the parties to the controversy, as alone raising
the question of jurisdiction; and if the existing controversy is
“between citizens of different states,” the judicial power of the
United States expressly extends to it.109
At this moment, Chief Justice Ellsworth interrupts Rawle, and asks “[h]ow far is it
meant to carry this argument? Will it be affirmed, that in every case, to which the
judicial power of the United States extends, the federal Courts may exercise a jurisdiction, without the intervention of the legislature, to distribute, and regulate, the
power?”110 Justice Chase then jumps in to observe:
103

Id. at 327 (opinion of Elsworth [sic], J.). It is worth noting here that some scholars
believe Ellsworth was the principal draftsman of the first Judiciary Act, in which case his
view as a justice can be seen as reflecting his view as a member of Congress. See James H.
Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV.
639, 640 n.3 (1942).
104
4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799).
105
See id. at 11 (opinion of Ellsworth, J.); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1
Stat. 73, 78–79 (prohibiting any circuit court or district court from trying “any suit to recover
the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favour of an assignee, unless
a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment
had been made”).
106
Turner, 4 U.S. at 10–11 (opinion of Ellsworth, J.).
107
Id. at 8.
108
Id. at 9–10.
109
Id. at 10.
110
Id. at 10 n.1.
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The notion has frequently been entertained, that the federal
Courts derive their judicial power immediately from the constitution; but the political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial
power, (except in a few specified instances) belongs to congress.
If congress has given the power to this Court, we possess it, not
otherwise: and if congress has not given the power to us, or to
any other court, it still remains at the legislative disposal. Besides, congress is not bound, and it would, perhaps, be inexpedient, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal Courts, to every
subject, in every form, which the constitution might warrant.111
Neither Ellsworth’s nor Chase’s statements made their way into the opinion of the
Court; nevertheless, they are among the strongest expressions in support of the
current orthodoxy: that Congress controls federal jurisdiction.
There are, however, three caveats to placing too much weight on either of these
two observations. First, Chase was explicitly making a point about “political truth”—
which might not have anything to do with what the Constitution actually means or
what the Framers intended.112 Second, Ellsworth’s opinion for the Court focuses
narrowly on inferior courts,113 and therefore applies at most to the weak version of
my thesis. Finally, the Court did not uphold the provision of the Act on the basis of
the congressional control presumption;114 it therefore reveals something about the
views of two Justices, but does not represent legal authority for the modern orthodoxy. Turner is still quite important, because subsequent courts relied on it heavily,
if not exclusively, as support for the congressional control presumption.
Three other cases from this era warrant brief mention. First is United States v.
Hudson and Goodwin,115 which addressed the question of whether circuit courts
could “exercise a common law jurisdiction in criminal cases.”116 Writing for the
Court, Justice Johnson concluded:
Of all the courts which the United States may, under their general powers, constitute, one only, the Supreme Court, possesses
jurisdiction derived immediately from the constitution, and of
which the legislative power cannot deprive it. All other Courts
created by the general Government possess no jurisdiction but
what is given them by the power that creates them, and can be
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 10 n.1 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 10–11 (opinion of Ellsworth, J.).
Id. at 11 (opinion of Ellsworth, J.).
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
Id. at 32.
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vested with none but what the power ceded to the general Government will authorize them to confer.117
The Court then refused to rule on the question of whether the jurisdiction was within
the constitutional grant but dismissed the case for lack of statutorily conferred subject
matter jurisdiction. Had the Court concluded that the Constitution did provide for federal jurisdiction over the matter but that Congress had taken it away, then the Court
would have been forced to address the issue of self-execution versus congressional
control. But it did not, and so the case only weakly supports the conventional view.
Second is M’Intire v. Wood,118 where the Court addressed whether the circuit
court had authority to issue a writ of mandamus under section 14 of the Judiciary Act,
which created such power if the court had jurisdiction over the underlying dispute.
The dispute arose under federal law, because the plaintiff argued he was entitled to
land based on federal statute.119 Nevertheless, in an opinion by Justice Johnson, the
Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court could not issue the writ of mandamus, because “the legislature have not thought proper to delegate the exercise of that
power to its Circuit Courts, except in certain specified cases.”120 Notably, however,
Johnson’s conclusion was predicated on the power of the Supreme Court to review
the judgment of a state court, where he believed this issue should be litigated in the
first instance, yet a few years later, Chief Justice Marshall explicitly rejected this
very notion when he argued that Supreme Court review of state court decisions
dealing with federal statutory questions was insufficient to vindicate federal law.121
Finally, in Kendall v. United States,122 a sort of mirror image of M’Intire, the
Supreme Court upheld the authority of the D.C. Circuit Court to issue a writ of
mandamus, precisely because that court had statutorily created jurisdiction.123
C. Joseph Story and John Marshall on the Federal Judiciary
Perhaps the best known early exposition of Article III is contained in Justice
Story’s opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.124 The case arose when Virginia’s
highest court refused to abide by an order of the Supreme Court of the United States.125
The Virginia court’s refusal was based on that court’s belief that the Constitution did
not authorize appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court from its judgments.126 In
117
118
119
120
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Id. at 33.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813).
Id. at 505.
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Osborn v. President of the Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822–23 (1824).
37 U.S. 524 (1838).
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Id. at 323–24.
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rejecting the state court’s view, Justice Story put forth his own view of Article III.127
His view amounts to a powerful rejection of the congressional control paradigm.
In short, although Justice Story viewed congressional action as necessary, he also
viewed it as mandatory: that is, Congress was obligated to act.128 The Constitution
directed the flow of jurisdiction through Congress, but the Constitution also dictated
that Congress do what was necessary to vest that jurisdiction.129 As Justice Story put
it, Congress is required to place in the federal courts “the whole judicial power.”130
As part of this discussion of mandatory duty, Justice Story put forward the assertion
(made famous by Professor Amar’s two-tier thesis) that, notwithstanding the permissive
language of the Exceptions Clause, Congress is obligated to create some inferior
courts; otherwise, some jurisdiction mandatorily required to be vested in the federal
judiciary would not reach its constitutional destination.131 Justice Story wrote:
The same expression, “shall be vested,” occurs in other parts
of the constitution, in defining the powers of the other co-ordinate branches of the government. The first article declares that
“all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States.” Will it be contended that the legislative
power is not absolutely vested? that the words merely refer to some
future act, and mean only that the legislative power may hereafter be vested? The second article declares that “the executive power
shall be vested in a president of the United States of America.”
Could congress vest it in any other person; or, is it to await their
good pleasure, whether it is to vest at all? It is apparent that such
a construction, in either case, would be utterly inadmissible.
Why, then, is it entitled to a better support in reference to the
judicial department?132
In certain respects, Justice Story’s view of Article III was forgotten or overlooked until Professor Amar explored it. In any case, Justice Story’s understanding
127

Id. at 324 (“The questions involved in this judgment are of great importance and
delicacy. Perhaps it is not too much to affirm, that, upon their right decision, rest some of the
most solid principles which have hitherto been supposed to sustain and protect the constitution itself.”).
128
Id. at 328.
129
Id. at 328–31 (“The language of the article throughout is manifestly designed to be
mandatory upon the legislature.”). Justice Story’s view comports with—and is among the primary historical evidence for—the mandatory theories of Professors Amar and Clinton. See
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 39, at 206–10; Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra
note 37, at 749–54.
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Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 331.
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Id. at 330–31.
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Id. at 329–30.
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has undoubtedly attracted fewer adherents than the arguably competing view put
forward by Chief Justice Marshall, who is fairly viewed as the father of the congressional control presumption.133 Speeches Marshall made at the Virginia ratification
convention presaged those influential opinions he later wrote, opinions which in
some cases embrace a robust judicial power, but in others quite significantly restricted the power of the federal judiciary.134
Chief Justice Marshall’s view, however, as I will show, is far less categorical
than is commonly believed. Moreover, while he was certainly of the founding
generation, Marshall himself cannot be said to have articulated the beliefs of the
Constitution’s Framers. Indeed, Marshall did not actually attend the Philadelphia
Convention.135 And his apparent rejection of the self-executing thesis in fact reflects
an insensitivity to several critical structural issues discussed at the convention.
It is of course well-known that the dominant political model prevalent in the
colonies prior to the drafting of the Constitution was a model of legislative supremacy.136 In this model, the power of the judicial branch is not on par with the legislature’s
power, and in view of the colonial experience with the British monarchy, this affinity
for legislative supremacy is not surprising. In time, the Framers would invent the
idea of three co-equal branches, but their first attempt to replace the British model
from which they had fled was one where the legislature was dominant.137
The pre-constitutional mode of governance is significant because it strongly
influenced Chief Justice Marshall’s view of how the United States Constitution was
supposed to operate. Indeed, although one of Marshall’s most famous lines is “it is
a Constitution we are expounding,”138 Marshall’s major opinions touching on the
question of jurisdiction reveal that he stubbornly viewed courts as creations of either
the common law or the legislature. In other words, the proposition that they were
created directly by the Constitution appears not to have occurred to him. Thus, in
Ex parte Bollman,139 where the Court considered whether it could issue a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to a statutory grant,140 Marshall observed: “Courts which
originate in the common law possess a jurisdiction which must be regulated by the
133

See Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 847–48 (citations omitted) (“The Court’s
current doctrinal assumptions rest primarily on the uninformed views of Chief Justice
Marshall, who has neither attended the Convention nor, so far as we can tell, seen Madison’s
notes of the debates.”); Engdahl, supra note 26, at 527 (discussing the unorthodox latent
ingredient theory adopted by Marshall in Osborn v. President of the Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824)).
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See infra note 243.
135
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McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
139
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
140
Id. at 94.

2016]

IS THE “ARISING UNDER” GRANT SELF-EXECUTING?

25

common law, until some statute shall change their established principles; but courts
which are created by written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law,
cannot transcend that jurisdiction.”141 This binary view (common law versus legislation) manifestly influenced Marshall’s construction of the Constitution’s Exceptions
Clause, which he addressed in several later opinions.
For example, in United States v. More,142 he approached the question of whether
the federal courts had a given power by focusing entirely on ascertaining what
Congress had done. In Chief Justice Marshall’s words: “[A]s the jurisdiction of the
court has been described, it has been regulated by congress, and an affirmative
description of its powers must be understood as a regulation, under the constitution,
prohibiting the exercise of other powers than those described.”143
Finally, in Durousseau v. United States,144 Chief Justice Marshall’s traditional
view began to take shape as a theory that would later become the congressional
control presumption. The basic facts of Durousseau are as follows: Durousseau and
other ship owners were set to sail from New Orleans to Charleston.145 Before they
left they got a bond from the federal government that required them to repay the debt
on the bond if they did not get their cargo to Charleston; they were excused from
payment on the bond, however, if they were prevented from landing in Charleston
by dangers of the sea.146 During the voyage, a storm came up forcing them to dock
in Havana.147 While in port, the Spanish government seized the ship and its cargo.148
The United States brought an action on the bond and the ship owners claimed they
fell into the dangers of the sea exception.149 The Federal Court of Louisiana, which
had been created by an 1804 act of Congress, had the power of both a district court
and a circuit court.150 Sitting as a district court, the federal court in New Orleans
found for the government.151 The ship owners appealed to the Supreme Court.152
Before the Supreme Court, the Attorney General argued that the Court did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case because “[t]he courts of the United States can
exercise no jurisdiction not expressly given by statute,” and the Act of 1804 had not
given the Supreme Court jurisdiction over writs of error from the District Court of
Louisiana.153 Rather, the Act of 1804 only gave the Supreme Court appellate review
141
142
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over writs of error heard by circuit courts.154 Chief Justice Marshall’s response to
this argument was an embrace of the congressional control presumption.155 He said:
Had the judicial act created the Supreme Court, without defining
or limiting its jurisdiction, it must have been considered as
possessing all the jurisdiction which the constitution assigns to
it. The legislature would have exercised the power it possessed
of creating a supreme court as ordained by the constitution; and,
in omitting to exercise the right of excepting from its constitutional powers, would have necessarily left those powers undiminished. The appellate powers of this court are not given by the
judicial act. They are given by the constitution. But they are
limited and regulated by the judicial act, and by such other acts
as have been passed on the subject.156
As important as Durousseau is to the congressional control presumption, it is
certainly not one of Chief Justice Marshall’s most persuasive or coherent opinions.
In the first place, Marshall concluded the Supreme Court did in fact possess jurisdiction over the dispute, suggesting that the entire jurisdictional power discussion is
dicta.157 In the course of that prolonged dicta, Marshall went so far as to suggest that
Congress could have even decided not to create the Supreme Court at all, and thereby
control even the Court’s original jurisdiction158—a proposition that virtually no one
accepts (despite that it is logically dictated by his understanding of the potency of
the Exceptions Clause). Elsewhere, Marshall intimated (perhaps paradoxically) that
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is self-executing.159 Those shortcomings
notwithstanding, Durousseau proved to be historically significant, for it is the first
robust statement that Congress’s power includes the power to regulate federal
jurisdiction; moreover, Marshall’s view rests quite firmly on the premise that
Congress has the power to regulate jurisdiction precisely because it has the power
to create lower federal courts—that is: the greater power to create includes the lesser
power to control defined jurisdiction.160
154
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Chief Justice Marshall’s next significant contribution to the subject, and the
single case most responsible for laying the foundation for the congressional control
presumption was, of course, Osborn v. President of the Bank of the United States.161
As I will suggest, however, the Osborn opinion is porous and far from categorical;
indeed, I will show that the opinion itself, and certainly the subsequent use to which
it has been put, are perfectly consistent with the self-executing thesis.
The facts of Osborn are well-known and uncomplicated: The Bank of the United
States, a creature of federal statute, sued in federal court to enjoin Osborn, the Ohio
state auditor, from acting in accordance with an act of the Ohio legislature, which
directed Osborn to levy and collect a tax on certain banks, of which the Bank of the
United States was one.162 Although an injunction issued, Osborn’s ostensible agent,
Harper, forcefully took some $100,000 from the Bank, which the circuit court
directed be returned.163
In the Supreme Court, Osborn made two arguments. First, he challenged the
existence of federal jurisdiction on statutory grounds, arguing that the words of the
statute that created the Bank did not vest it with power to sue; second, he maintained
that even if the words of the statute did vest the Bank with that ability, such a grant
of authority exceeded Congress’s power and was therefore unconstitutional.164 This
latter argument is evocative of Marshall’s own argument in Marbury v. Madison.165
Chief Justice Marshall spent little time on the former argument; the bulk of the
opinion in Osborn is directed at the second, constitutional, claim. Marshall wrote:
“The executive department may constitutionally execute every law which the Legislature may constitutionally make, and the judicial department may receive from the
Legislature the power of construing every such law.”166 This crucial sentence seems
capable of two plausible interpretations. The first construction, seized on by defenders
of the congressional control presumption, would be that the judicial department may
decide every case that the legislature authorizes it to decide, but only such cases as
the legislature explicitly authorizes it to decide. This construction would be akin to
the congressional control presumption. The second construction, however, fits more
comfortably with the self-executing thesis. This construction would be that the judicial department may decide any case that arises by virtue of something the legislature has done. Under this second view, the legislature must act for there to be a case,
but having enacted the statute that gives rise to the case, the judicial department’s
power with respect to that case is plenary.
to strip the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction, even over constitutional issues. See, e.g.,
South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 396 (1984); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 109 (1968).
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Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Osborn is not entirely unambiguous as between these views. For example, in discussing the meaning of the phrase “arising
under,” Marshall wrote:
This clause enables the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution, laws, and treaties of
the United States, when any question respecting them shall assume
such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it.
That power is capable of acting only when the subject is submitted
to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by
law. It then becomes a case, and the constitution declares, that the
judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.167
Marshall seems to suggest in this passage that although Congress often has the
power to determine whether an individual has suffered an injury such that there is
a constitutional case, if there is a case that arises under federal law, then the Constitution itself vests the federal court with the power to resolve it. Moreover, in a
passage discussing Congress’s power to control jurisdiction of the lower courts,
Marshall again uses language consistent with the idea that the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction is self-executing.168 He wrote:
We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial
power of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an
ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to
give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other
questions of fact or of law may be involved in it.169
Chief Justice Marshall understood Article III, as a whole, as designed to ensure
that the federal judicial power be sufficient to enable it to engage in the “construction
of all [the federal government’s] acts, so far as they affect the rights of individuals”170—
an objective that could be assured only if federal jurisdiction is self-executing.
In the contemporary jurisprudence of jurisdiction, Osborn is less known for its
connection to the congressional control presumption than it is for its definition of
“arising under.” In perhaps the case’s most famous sentence, Chief Justice Marshall
concluded that “when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the
167
168
169
170
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power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause[.]”171 Yet this
very statement—meant to define whether a case arises under federal law—has become
a central pillar of the congressional control orthodoxy. It stands for the proposition that
although constitutional “arising under” jurisdiction is virtually unlimited,172 it is within
Congress’s power to vest federal courts with all, or any part, of this jurisdiction. Because Congress has never been deemed to have vested the entire constitutional grant,173
a gap is presumed to exist between the statutory meaning of “arising under” and its
constitutional definition, and federal courts do not have the power to adjudicate cases
that reside in that gap. The idea that such a gap is permissible, that it can exist, represents a rejection of the self-executing thesis, and the idea has its basis in Osborn.
But Osborn cannot bear the weight the current orthodoxy places on it. As a
contemporary matter, the case is commonly associated with what is now known as
supplemental jurisdiction (which encompasses what were previously known as the
distinct categories of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction). Because the Bank’s charter
included a provision allowing it to sue or be sued in any federal circuit court, Chief
Justice Marshall reasoned that this provision meant that any suit involving the Bank
would arise under federal law—for it was federal law (i.e., the charter) that permitted the Bank to be a litigant in federal court in the first place.174 This idea generated
the so-called latent ingredient theory of federal jurisdiction, but it is important that
the language in Osborn which gave rise to the latent ingredient theory immediately
followed a discussion of pendent jurisdiction in which Marshall described two alternative views. In the first alternative:
If it be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction, that the title or
right set up by the party, may be defeated by one construction of
the constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the
opposite construction, provided the facts necessary to support
the action be made out, then all the other questions must be decided as incidental to this, which gives that jurisdiction.175
This analysis, which provides the foundation for what has become the modern law
of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction,176 rests comfortably with the self-executing
171
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thesis. Thus, in discussing the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and judicial
power, Justice Brennan explained:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim “arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority . . . ,” and the relationship between that claim
and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional “case.” The federal
claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter
jurisdiction on the court. The state and federal claims must derive
from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff’s claims
are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one
judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal
issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.177
Further, the threshold question for any court considering whether to exercise
jurisdiction is whether there is a constitutional “case,” and Chief Justice Marshall’s
analysis of that issue is also compatible with the self-executing thesis. He wrote:
This [arising under] clause enables the judicial department to
receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States, when any question respecting them
shall assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of
acting on it. That power is capable of acting only when the subject
is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form
prescribed by law. It then becomes a case, and the constitution
declares, that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising
under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.178
Under this analysis, Congress retains the power to define statutory rights that may
be asserted in federal court. However, once Congress does so, and once a party
asserts those rights, a case exists, and once a case exists, it is the Constitution itself
that vests the federal court with jurisdiction to decide it.
In sum, the modern orthodoxy, the congressional control presumption, rests on
a series of opinions authored by Chief Justice Marshall. But Marshall himself was
not a participant at the Philadelphia Convention, and his understanding of jurisdiction seems trapped in the legal structure that saw all judicial power as having either
177
178

Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 819.
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common law or statutory roots—which is to say, he did not yet appreciate the
possibility that power could stem directly from the Constitution. Finally, despite the
embrace of these several Marshall opinions by advocates of the congressional control presumption, the holdings themselves, as well as the language, are by and large
consistent with the self-executing theory.
D. Further Manifestations of the Presumption in the Nineteenth Century
Whatever ambiguity may have resided at the core of Osborn itself regarding the
weak version of my thesis was eradicated in the mid-nineteenth century, principally
by dicta in Cary v. Curtis179 and Sheldon v. Sill.180 In Cary, for example, the Court
expressed no uncertainty at all about whether inferior federal courts had only the
jurisdiction Congress expressly gave to them, holding:
[T]he courts created by statute must look to the statute as the
warrant for their authority; certainly they cannot go beyond the
statute, and assert an authority with which they may not be invested
by it, or which may be clearly denied to them. This argument is in
nowise impaired by admitting that the judicial power shall extend
to all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States. Perfectly consistent with such an admission is the truth,
that the organization of the judicial power, the definition and distribution of the subjects of jurisdiction in the federal tribunals, and
the modes of their action and authority, have been, and of right
must be, the work of the Legislature.181
To be sure, this passage addresses only the weak version of the self-executing thesis,
leaving the stronger version intact. Moreover, the Court’s defense of the congressional control presumption was apparently triggered by two dissenting opinions—by
Justice Story and Justice McLean—that expressed a contrary view. The dissenters
envisioned a much less potent congressional power.182 Justice Story quite directly
intimated that “the judicial power [is] given by the Constitution”183—presumably
without any need for congressional enabling. Nevertheless, principally because of
179
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this passage, Cary is routinely cited for the proposition that Congress has authority
to restrict the flow of jurisdiction to inferior federal courts.184
By the time of Cary, therefore, what had begun in Turner v. President of the Bank
of North-America185 as a dictum pertaining to a so-called political truth had insinuated itself into the case law as an unremarkable constitutional article of faith. Even
so, self-executing arguments continued to be asserted before the Court from time to
time. A particularly powerful example is the case of Sheldon v. Sill.
Both the factual predicate and legal question presented were akin to Turner, and
the Court addressed whether section 11 of the Judiciary Act’s restriction on diversity
jurisdiction through assignment was unconstitutional.186 Counsel for Sill argued that
because jurisdiction flowed directly from the Constitution, Congress did not have
the power to divert it.187 Justice Grier’s opinion acknowledged that the matter turned
on whether the Constitution itself “ordained and established the inferior courts, and
distributed to them their respective powers.”188 But on that issue, the Supreme Court’s
rejection of that argument was emphatic:
Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. Courts created by
statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.
No one of them can assert a just claim to jurisdiction exclusively
conferred on another, or withheld from all.
The Constitution has defined the limits of the judicial power
of the United States, but has not prescribed how much of it shall
be exercised by the Circuit Court; consequently, the statute
which does prescribe the limits of their jurisdiction, cannot be in
conflict with the Constitution, unless it confers powers not enumerated therein.
Such has been the doctrine held by this court since its first
establishment.189
Justice Grier’s reasoning epitomized the “greater includes the lesser” analytic, and
although the facts of the case dealt specifically with diversity jurisdiction, the
184
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Court’s sweeping language has widely been relied upon to buttress the proposition
that Congress may broadly regulate the jurisdiction of all courts of its creation.190
So, for example, in Railroad Co. v. Mississippi,191 a case involving the federal
question jurisdiction grant in the Judiciary Act of 1875, the first Justice Harlan observed that whether a dispute was properly removable “depend[ed] altogether upon
the construction and effect of an act of Congress.”192 Osborn, of course, while
suggesting Congress had power to restrict federal jurisdiction, had not upheld that
proposition, nor had Chief Justice Marshall deemed the statutory grant to be narrower than the constitutional grant, so the issue of whether the statutory language
was coterminous with the constitutional language did continue to arise from time to
time. In the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases,193 for example, the Court upheld a
decision permitting removal to federal court by construing the federal question language in the 1875 statute as roughly coterminous with the constitutional grant, relying
on Marshall’s opinion in Osborn as authority.194 On the other hand, Chief Justice
Waite (joined again by Justice Miller) concluded that Congress had not intended the
statutory grant to reach the outer limit of what the Constitution allowed, that Marshall
had been incorrect in Osborn in so believing, and that Congress was not obligated
to vest the entirety of the permissible jurisdictional menu.195
E. The Early Twentieth Century and the Entrenchment of the Orthodox View
Whatever one might say about the views expressed in the cases from the last
quarter of the nineteenth century, the first cluster of cases addressing the need for
and meaning of the 1875 Act, it is clear that Justice Cardozo and Justice Frankfurter
190

See, e.g., Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988).
102 U.S. 135 (1880).
192
Id. at 139–40. Although Justice Harlan acknowledged the power of Congress to regulate jurisdiction, he did not address whether the statutory and constitutional grant were
coterminous. Justice Miller, however, in dissent, explicitly viewed the statutory grant as narrower
than the constitutional provision; he therefore appears to have seen the Constitution as delimiting the outer limit of what Congress could do, rather than a menu Congress was
obligated to enable. Id. at 142–44 (Miller, J., dissenting). In any event, the precise questions
presented in the case would later be superseded by the well-pleaded complaint rule line of
decisions, including Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
193
115 U.S. 1 (1885). In response to the decision, Congress eventually took steps to
preclude federal jurisdiction in similar cases. See generally FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra
note 4; Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 509–11 (1916).
194
Pac. R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. at 14.
195
Id. at 24 (Waite, C.J., dissenting). Years later, Justice Cardozo would look back on the
cases from this era and conclude the Court had not been perspicuous either in parsing the
jurisdictional requirements of the statute, or in analyzing the fit between the statute and the
constitutional language. See generally Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936). I think
Cardozo’s assessment is a fair one and it would therefore be a mistake to read too much into
the cases from this era in exploring the self-executing thesis.
191
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were correct when they intimated that these cases were not beacons of clarity.196 But
finally, in the first half of the twentieth century, the view that there was a gap between the statutory grant and the constitutional grant, and that the existence of such
a gap did not present a constitutional difficulty, became entrenched.
Perhaps the most prominent illustration of the orthodox view is Justice Rutledge’s
concurring opinion in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.197
The issue concerned Congress’s amendment of the diversity statute, providing that
citizens of the District of Columbia were to be treated as citizens of a state for diversity purposes, and whether Congress had authority to vest the federal courts with
jurisdiction over these cases.198 There was no majority opinion, but the case is
presently important because Justice Rutledge deemed it a matter of “elementary
doctrine that the words of Article III are not self-executing grants of jurisdiction to
the inferior federal courts.”199 Rutledge viewed this proposition as uncontroversial
and well-established, going so far as to suggest “[i]t has never heretofore been
doubted that the constitutional grant of power is broader than the general federalquestion jurisdiction which Congress has from time to time thought to confer on
district courts by statute.”200 The dissenters, too, embraced the same conception of
the power of Congress to control lower federal court jurisdiction.201 Thus, Chief Justice
Vinson, joined by Justice Douglas, repeated that “Congress need not have established
any such [inferior federal] courts”;202 and that greater power perforce dictates those
courts possess “only such authority as is vested in them by the Congress.”203 By the
second half of the century, there can be no doubt that the orthodox view, whatever
its analytical and historical limitations, had become hornbook law.204 As a result, in
a case like Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,205 Chief Justice Burger could
196

See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips, 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (discussing how the early
cases lacked exacting analysis of the Judiciary Act of 1875); Gully, 299 U.S. at 113–14. See
generally Frankfurter, supra note 193.
197
337 U.S. 582 (1949).
198
Id. at 583 (plurality opinion).
199
Id. at 607 (Rutledge, J., concurring). While Rutledge’s opinion undoubtedly conflicts with
the weak version of the self-executing thesis, Rutledge simultaneously endorsed the strong version of the thesis with his citation to United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, where the Court noted
that “the Supreme Court [does] possess [ ] jurisdiction derived immediately from the constitution, and of which the legislative power cannot deprive it.” 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1813).
200
Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 613–14 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (citing, inter alia, Harry Shulman
& Edward C. Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45 YALE
L.J. 393, 405 n.47 (1936)).
201
Id. at 626–27 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
202
Id. at 627.
203
Id.
204
See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 494–95 (1983) (stating
that § 1331 had been continuously construed to provide different limitations on federal courts
than the Constitution).
205
Id. at 480.
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fairly observe: “Although the language of § 1331 parallels that of the ‘Arising Under’
Clause of Art. III, this court never has held that statutory ‘arising under’ jurisdiction
is identical to Art. III ‘arising under’ jurisdiction. Quite the contrary is true.”206
***
As we have seen, despite the mandatory language in Article III—the use of the
words shall extend—the jurisdictional menu came to be viewed as a sort of buffet
from which Congress could pick and choose. Although the Supreme Court did not
ever reject the self-execution thesis at any length, and although there are occasional
statements suggesting it is only with respect to the lower federal courts that Congress’s
power is plenary, it is also fair and accurate to say that the Court also never seriously
entertained the notion that the jurisdictional grant might be self-executing.207 As I
show in the next section, however, the self-executing theory is in fact far more harmonious with sentiments expressed by the Framers in Philadelphia and in the state
ratification debates than is the congressional control presumption. It is also more
harmonious with the basic structure of the Constitution.
IV. THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE REVISITED,208 AND THE
SELF-EXECUTING NATURE OF ARTICLE III
The orthodox view of congressional power sees Congress’s control over the judicial
branch as akin to the volume control on a television. Congress can “turn on” the federal
courts by creating them, and then set the dial to any position between “off” and “maximum volume,” where louder volume corresponds to a broader jurisdictional grant. My
thesis offers a competing metaphor that is more faithful to the historical record and
constitutional structure. Congress does not have a volume control; it has a light switch.
Congress has some power not to create inferior courts (it can leave the lights off),
but a decision to create them is akin to throwing a switch. The lights are on. The courts,
once created, possess all the power allotted by the Constitution.209 Advocates of the
206

Id. at 494.
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850) (“The [self-executing theory] has never been
asserted, and could not be defended with any show of reason . . . .”).
208
On the relevance of the work of the Committee of Detail to understanding the historical
records, see generally Ewald, supra note 81.
209
Although there has not been a great deal of scholarly support for the self-executing thesis,
there has been some that is compatible with it. Probably the two leading examples are
Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 103, at 640, and Ray Forrester, The Nature of a “Federal
Question,” 16 TUL. L. REV. 362, 376–77 (1942). Professor Forrester, in particular, argues persuasively that the 1875 statute was intended to be coterminous with the constitutional language,
such that if enabling legislation is required at all, the 1875 Act enabled all of the constitutionally
allotted jurisdiction. See Forrester, supra, at 375–76. This view of the relationship between
congressional and judicial power accords with the accepted relationship between congressional and executive power where Congress has the ability to grant power to the executive
207
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orthodox view have mistakenly inferred that because Congress has a light switch,
it also has a dimmer button; that inference is not supported by the historical record.
The sounder conclusion is that Congress’s power is much more circumscribed.
“The evident aim of the plan of the Convention,” wrote Alexander Hamilton in the
Federalist No. 82, “is, that all the causes of the specified classes shall, for weighty public reasons, receive their original or final determination in the courts of the Union.”210
Hamilton’s characterization of the Framers’ intentions strongly suggests that Article
III was understood by the Framers to be self-executing.211 In this section, I examine
the historical materials, which by and large support the self-executing thesis.
A. Pre-Constitutional Judicial Systems212
Early American experiences with the judicial function help shed light on what
the Framers hoped to accomplish by drafting Article III as they did.213 This section
explores these systems.
By the time of the revolution in the colonies, the common law had taken on the
status of fundamental law.214 In the view of the colonists, having recourse to the
branch, but not the further power to circumscribe that power once ceded. See supra notes
46–48 (discussing legislative veto and presidential removal power).
210
THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 355 (Alexander Hamilton) (Thompson & Homans eds., 1831).
211
Id.
212
The history of this era has been well-plowed. I merely address the highlights relevant
to the self-executing thesis, relying on authoritative historical examinations of the period. There
is, however, one comparatively recent analysis warranting specific mention. See Pfander & Birk,
supra note 55, at 1658. Professors Pfander and Birk make two important observations: first, that
the Scottish courts in this era were significantly more immune from parliamentary control than
were their English counterparts; second, that the Framers were well aware of the Scottish system
and practice. Indeed, although largely ignored for two centuries following the ratification of
the Constitution, the Scottish influence on the major American political thinkers and theorists—
including Jefferson, Hamilton, and Madison—is now well-known and widely accepted. See,
e.g., GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST (1981) (examining the influence
of the Scottish Enlightenment on Hamilton, Madison, and the Federalist Papers); GARRY WILLS,
INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1978) (examining the
influence of Scottish Enlightenment on Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence). As
Pfander and Birk show, the Scottish influence on James Wilson was also notable. In general, the
Framers’ familiarity with the Scottish legal architecture accords far better with the self-executing
thesis than with the current congressional control presumption. See Pfander & Birk, supra
note 55, at 1619–20, 1627–42, 1649–56. Professor Grove also notes internal disagreement
among the Framers regarding the role the inferior federal courts would play and the power they
would possess once created. Grove, supra note 9, at 888–89 & nn.94–98 (although she aligns
herself with the view that the compromise between the nationalists and the states-rights
advocates resulted in the congressional control presumption).
213
For a complete discussion of state judicial systems in this era, see 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR.,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS
TO 1801, at 1–195 (1971).
214
See id. at 89 (listing “common law precedents, the ancient rule that this law was their
birthright, the more recent doctrine that an Englishman carries this law with him, and the
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protections provided by common law was a primary element of their birthright.215
The judicial power was therefore understood by the colonists, and later by the states,
to play an instrumental role in the development and vindication of the fundamental
law under which the people lived.216
A corresponding development, reaching its apex with the formation of the
various state constitutions, was the ever-increasing power of the legislatures. Significant legislative power, however, meant that common law principles were vulnerable
to legislative encroachment. By the time the Constitutional Convention commenced,
various state legislatures were so powerful that the threat they posed to individual
rights was a widespread concern.217
Consequently, when the Framers met in Philadelphia, these twin developments—
courts as protectors of common law rights coupled with legislatures as overwhelmingly powerful—had created a powerful tension between the judicial and legislative
functions. In addition to being called upon to address the vertical tension created by
national and state relations, therefore, the Framers, in formulating a national judiciary,
had to resolve this horizontal tension between different aspects of the sovereign.
B. The Colonial Experience
The colonists carried with them to the new world their common law inheritance.218 The salient principles of the common law paradigm included several
guarantees of the rights and liberties of Englishmen granted in the charters” as constitutional
standards contained in the imperial constitution).
215
See id.
216
This conclusion follows from the fact that the common law is exclusively a creature of the
judicial branch. See, e.g., DONALD R. KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 165–86 (1990) (discussing the history and development of English
common law). “From the outset English law seemed to be the joint creation of the ‘reasonable
men’ of the sworn neighborhood assembly and the professional judges . . . .” Id. at 166. Because
Parliament originally was deemed a high court, its statutes were merely written manifestations
of the common law’s “immemorial custom.” Id. at 166–68. In sum, the common law was the
primary element in the English legal tradition and was a central structural principal of English
government; neither the King, nor, arguably, the Parliament was immune from its workings. See
GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 59 (discussing the judicial protection of common law rights held by
individuals from oppressive corporate bylaws permitted by royal grant); id. at 89–95 (discussing
the peculiar colonial conception that viewed parliamentary acts repugnant to common law right
void as against the imperial constitution); id. at 167 (suggesting that justice could be sought even
against the King); id. at 168 (stating that courts had wide discretion in the interpretation of
parliamentary acts).
217
See GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 142 (discussing the impotence of constitutional safeguards to protect against legislative encroachment of constitutional rights).
218
See id. at 9–18, 25–35 (discussing the various colonial judiciaries at some length);
KELLEY, supra note 216, at 185 (“The British legal tradition left its mark, too, on colonial
America, which carried out a ‘revolution’ against a government but in no sense against the
legal system—and which indeed might claim to be even more faithful to the principles of
common law than the Parliament of George III.”); Edward C. Surrency, The Courts in the
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interconnected concepts: first, the idea that law is something that is found, not made;219
second, that these discovered common law norms are grounded in particular communities, but have their origins in “custom immemorial”;220 and finally, that these norms
formed part of their heritage as Englishmen because they were part of the fundamental
law.221 In short, colonists viewed principles of common law much as we today view
the concepts of individual rights—the common law was their individual rights.222
Because the common law occupied such a central place in the colonists’ belief
matrix, they understood the judicial function to be critically important, for it was the
judicial branch that safeguarded these values from legislative encroachment. As is
well-known, a major element of the Bill of Particulars identified by the colonists in
the Declaration of Independence was the Crown’s nonadherence to various common
law protections, including trial by jury.223 The colonists complained that although
the King had the exclusive authority to create courts,224 he refused to do so.225
American Colonies, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 253, 266–76 (1967) (also discussing the various
colonial judiciaries at some length). Furthermore, the transportation of the common law to
the colonies was a process that occurred over a great period of time. Professor Goebel premises
his discussion of the early colonial judiciaries on the colonists’ experiences of the England
they left. Many of the colonists understood the administration of justice from their experiences
in the common law “backwaters” of England. GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 5. In other words,
their day-to-day experience was centered in their native rural jurisdictions, with the “myriad
inferior courts that administered local enactments and a variety of usages, some of great
antiquity, some reflecting, oftentimes clumsily, central court law.” Id. This experience was far
removed from the more polished common law procedure found in Westminster Hall. Id. He
states that this experience with the law more than any other factor primarily shaped early
colonial attitudes about the judiciary. Id. But see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 35 (2d ed. 1985) (providing a view that the exigencies of colonial life played
a major role in shaping colonial attitudes). Only later, as experienced lawyers expatriated to
the colonies, did the more formal procedures of the common law become introduced. See
GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 6–7. But never did the colonists lose the notion of the common
law as their inheritance and their right as Englishmen. See GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 25–
35; KELLEY, supra note 216, at 167; cf. RITZ, supra note 9, at 28–30.
219
See GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 25–35; KELLEY, supra note 216, at 167; cf. RITZ,
supra note 9, at 28–30.
220
See KELLEY, supra note 216, at 165–69 (discussing the common law’s roots in custom
and how it was a form of second nature); cf. RITZ, supra note 9, at 28–30 (explaining that the
essential trial function was to find the true rule of law).
221
See GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 89.
222
Id.
223
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776); see also GOEBEL, supra
note 213, at 87–95.
224
See Surrency, supra note 218, at 257–63 (“The power to establish courts in the
beginning of the seventeenth century in England was the exclusive prerogative of the king.”).
For a more exhaustive discussion of the evolution of colonial judicial systems see GOEBEL,
supra note 213, at 3–18.
225
E.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, reprinted in THE LIFE AND SELECTED
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 23–29 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds.,1944)
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The power of the King to create courts manifested itself in the colonies by placing
this erstwhile judicial power into the executive branch.226 Thus, while the original
charters of the colonies addressed the power to make laws (much the same way that
corporate charters grant corporations the power to create bylaws),227 they rarely mentioned the power to create judiciaries, nor did they create distinct judiciaries.228 In
the colonial experience, therefore, the judicial power was effectively a dimension
of the executive power, for all aspects of the administration of justice flowed directly
from the King to the colonial governors.229 Consequently, governors resolved what
we today would view as legal disputes subject to litigation,230 and only later, as the
number and complexity of these disputes increased, were courts formed.231 Many
colonial assemblies enacted statutes codifying the then-existing judicial systems.232
C. State Judicial Systems
Prior to the constitutional period, the model of state judicial systems was legislative supremacy.233 One objective the states sought to achieve when they formed
their respective constitutions, therefore, was to legislatively reduce principles of
fundamental law to a writing that was clear and complete.234 Yet how to safeguard
these constitutions and their fundamental principles from future legislative encroachment was unclear and untested.235 To be sure, the notion of separated powers
(stating that the King “refus[ed] his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers” and
charging the King with obstructing justice by failing to establish a system of courts); see also
GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 97.
226
GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 91.
227
See id. at 3–4.
228
Id.
229
Id. at 4 (“As respects anything on which there was no specific legislation, the colonists
were initially left to their own devices. As it turned out, a truly impressive mass of detail—
forms, modes of procedure and rules of substance—was put into effect without any legislative
direction whatever.”).
230
See Surrency, supra note 218, at 253, 259–61 (stating that the lack of separation of powers
in early colonial governments permitted the governors and the assemblies to act as courts).
231
Id. at 259.
232
See id. at 262. In other words, colonial legislation dealing with courts was not, in the executory sense, enabling. The judicial systems already existed when these assemblies acted, and the
legislation merely maintained the status quo. See GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 12–16 (discussing
the King’s intolerance of tinkering with the judicial systems by colonial legislatures).
233
See GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 136–42; cf. RITZ, supra note 9, at 27–52 (discussing
the structural aspects of late eighteenth-century state judicial systems and comparing them
to today’s courts).
234
See GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 96–102 (“Because they and their forebears had lived
for generations according to the terms of the written instruments establishing or regulating
the structure of their governments, the conviction had been bred that only through matter of
record could the metes and bounds of the fundamental law be secured.”).
235
See id. at 105–22 (discussing means other than judicial review in which legislative
power was kept in check).
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was well-known, but how precisely this concept would operate to safeguard fundamental law was not well understood, and states lacked mechanisms to implement
it.236 Most significantly, the judicial branch could not be relied upon to police the
separation of powers and other fundamental principles, because the courts were
entirely subordinate to the legislature.
For example, one important way in which the judicial function was subordinate
to the legislative was that the courts derived all their power from legislation.237 State
legislatures had, for the most part, plenary power over the judicial function, and no
evidence exists that the states envisioned or had any beliefs about the notion of a
self-executing judiciary. Indeed, state legislatures even possessed the power to deprive the courts of various forms of jurisdiction.238 Some legislatures actually tried
cases themselves, and some drafted rules of decision.239
Even the emerging institution of judicial review had but limited effect in altering
the distribution of power between the judicial and legislative spheres.240 The ostensible reason is that the colonial belief in legislative supremacy was so deeply entrenched
that it far outweighed the desire to vest the judicial branch with the responsibility
of protecting fundamental law. As Professor Goebel has written:
[T]he inexorable tide of democracy, had blunted the edges of certain pronouncements of principle in the constitutions . . . . Such
provisions had been embodied without foresight as to the effects of
the inflation of legislative authority, although the object lesson
of Parliament was fresh in everyone’s mind. It very soon became
evident that theoretical limitations had as a practical matter been
236

See id. at 98–99. Some state constitutions made explicit reference to separation of
powers, but this homage was largely toothless. Other states attempted to achieve judicial
independence through salary and tenure provisions. See id. at 98. But legislative encroachment of the judicial function persisted even in the face of these provisions. See id.
237
See id. at 97–98 (discussing the “deep-rooted and pervasive belief that the ordering of
the judicial system should be committed to the legislative branch”). Colonial legislatures
often attempted to experiment with judicial structure, but the King, in preserving his prerogative, largely prevented these attempts at change. See id. The pervasiveness of legislative
supremacy over the judicial branch during early statehood may have been a backlash response to this experience.
238
See id. (discussing how legislation was necessary in some states to alter the courts’
jurisdiction).
239
Id. at 98–99.
240
See id. at 125–42. Even though the theory of constitutional supremacy became a rule of
judicial action in the early states, the “primacy of state legislatures was so far advanced that any
judicial rebuff of their expressed will had the appearance of a challenge to the established political order.” Id. at 126. Few courts directly challenged legislative enactments based on the principle of constitutional supremacy. Id. For a more complete discussion of the origins of judicial
review, see ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 4–55 (1989),
and William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005).
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displaced by the incompatible reality of legislative supremacy. As
a result, legislatures assumed the prerogative of themselves judging
whether or not they had strayed beyond the bounds fixed in the
constitution, but the occasions of open admission that they had
acted “contrary to the spirit of the constitution” were very rare
indeed. In all the states the drift was toward subversion of the original design of limited constitutional government and its replacement by the unrestraint of English parliamentary hegemony. In the
climate thus created, even the most candid and eloquent assertion
of judicial duty was not effective to still charges of usurpation.241
D. Judicial Experiments Under the Continental Congress
One striking feature of the Confederation was that the judicial function was an
enclave reserved exclusively to the states;242 there were no courts with jurisdiction
across state boundaries. Exceptions were created from time to time, on an ad hoc
basis,243 but they lacked permanence, and there was no mechanism for enforcing
orders that emerged from these tribunals. The absence of any courts with national
jurisdiction was troubling, because there were in fact problems of national importance. Perhaps the most important such issue taken up by the Continental Congress
involved the proper disposition of captures at sea.244 Appeals from state court
decisions disposing of these prize cases were made directly to the Congress,245 and
as the case load increased, the appeals were referred to a standing committee.246
Later, the Continental Congress formed the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture to
hear these cases.247 This court was, for the most part, devoid of enforcement power,
241

GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 142.
Id. at 143.
243
See id. at 172–95 (discussing cases of capture and federal appellate courts); Clinton,
A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 754–57; John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal
Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 6–9 (1948); see also GOEBEL, supra note
213, at 146 (“[E]fforts to make the jurisdiction properly effective very shortly revealed the
formidable difficulties of exercising judicial authority on the Continental level in an atmosphere
of reluctance.”). In the Virginia ratification convention, John Marshall recognized that Article
III of the proposed constitution was “a great improvement on that system from which we are
now departing.” 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 551 (J. Elliot ed., 1901) [hereinafter Elliot, DEBATES].
244
GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 147–82; Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 755–56.
245
See GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 147–82 (discussing the establishment of appellate
jurisdiction).
246
Id. at 150.
247
See id. The Articles of Confederation were approved after the establishment of this
court. The Articles provided for the establishment of a court with like jurisdiction. Article
IX provided that:
The United States, in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . appointing courts for the trial of piracies
and felonies committed on the high seas; and establishing courts for
242
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and its decisions were frequently ignored by state courts or treated as mere recommendations.248 This situation led to many embarrassments for the fledgling nation
in the area of international relations,249 and was instrumental in the development of
the jurisdictional menu at the Constitutional Convention.250
After the success of the American Revolution, which obviously occasioned the
loss of the overarching judicial system provided by England,251 there was an immediate problem in the colonies resulting from the fact that there was no agreed-upon
means (judicial or otherwise) for resolving interstate disputes. The Articles of Confederation purported to address this void by providing “[t]he United States, in
Congress assembled, shall also be the last resort on appeal, in all disputes and
differences now subsisting, or that hereafter may arise between two or more States
concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever; which authority
shall always be exercised in the manner following . . . .”252
But this provision proved cumbersome and largely ineffective.253 Thus, at the
Constitutional Convention254 and during the subsequent ratification debates,255 few
receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures;
provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of any
of the said courts.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, § 1. However, the Court of Appeals continued
to operate after approval of the Articles as it had before. See GOEBEL, supra note 213, at
172–74; Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 755.
248
See GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 172–82. Furthermore, the court was not in any way independent of Congress and was subject to no small amount of intermeddling. See id. at 178.
249
See id. at 165–82 (discussing many instances of state impropriety toward foreigners
and pressures put on the national government by foreign powers to remedy the abuses and
treaty violations).
250
See Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 757.
251
Prior to the American Revolution, disputes between the states were resolved by the
Privy Council. See GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 182.
252
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, § 2. The procedural “manner” referred
to in this provision required that, upon petition to Congress by the aggrieved state, and following notice to the other state, both states should “appoint, by joint consent, commissioners or
judges to constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in question.” Id. If consent
could not be achieved, the Articles provided for selection of judges by Congress with peremptory strikes by the states. Id. The judgment of the court was to be final and decisive, and the
judgment was to be “transmitted to Congress, and lodged among the acts of Congress, for
the security of the parties concerned.” Id.
253
See GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 182–95 (discussing controversies between states).
254
A provision for the resolution of controversies between states separate from the federal
judiciary was originally conceived in the convention. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION of 1787, at 183–84 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter Farrand, RECORDS]
(report of the committee of detail). However, the Framers felt that this class of controversy
could be adequately addressed by the federal judiciary. See id. at 400–01.
255
See 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 243, at 523 (comments by G. Mason), 532 (comments by J. Madison), 549 (comments by E. Pendleton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 342
(Alexander Hamilton) (Thompson & Homans eds., 1831).
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questioned the need to extend federal jurisdiction to the resolution of disputes between states.
In addition, the Articles of Confederation provided Congress with no means of
enforcing its enumerated powers. Its resolves were treated by the states as mere
recommendations and could be freely ignored.256 The relative impotence of Congress
in enforcing its will led to the unanimous opinion among the Framers that an independent, national judiciary was needed so that the states could be compelled to adhere to federal law.257 Only through federal judicial oversight could the horizontal
tension created by the Articles of Confederation be resolved in favor of the predominance of federal power.
E. The Constitutional Convention
In May of 1787, the Constitutional Convention convened.258 Delegates from all
the states met in Philadelphia, ostensibly to revise the Articles of Confederation.259
The delegates agreed, without exception, that some form of national judiciary was
needed.260 Hence, the debates concerning the federal judiciary dealt not at all with
whether there was a pressing need for one, but instead on what form it would take
and what powers it would have.261
The judicial system that emerged from the Convention was novel, and many
scholars have admired and discussed many aspects of its novelty.262 Yet one of its
most important innovations has been largely ignored. This innovation involved the
source of judicial power. Whereas the courts with which the Framers were familiar had
256

See GOEBEL, supra note 213, at 342 (stating that resolves having the legal effect of an
act of assembly were used by the New England colonies, but this quality could hardly be
claimed by the Continental Congress because of its “political constitution”).
257
See id. at 195; Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 757 (“The experience [under
the Articles of Confederation] highlighted, among other things, the need to avoid the
ponderous delay and inconvenience created by the ad hoc establishment of hearing tribunals,
the importance of the national disposition of certain judicial cases to orderly diplomatic
relations and to the domestic harmony of the states, the need for judges who could decide
such questions independent of any obligations owed to the states that appointed them, and
the extreme difficulty of enforcing national judgments affecting important state interests.”).
258
Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 757.
259
For a general discussion of the Constitutional Convention, see, e.g., Robert N. Clinton,
A Brief History of the Adoption of the United States Constitution, 75 IOWA L. REV. 891 (1990).
For a discussion of the work of the critical Committee of Detail, see Ewald, supra note 81.
260
See Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 757.
261
See id.
262
As I suggest above, however, the extent to which some of this novelty grew out of the
Framers’ familiarity with the Scottish legal system has only recently been examined, and no
supporter of the congressional control presumption has discussed Congress’s power to control
federal jurisdiction in the context of the Framers understanding of the relationship between
Scottish courts and Parliament. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 55, at 1619.
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derived their power from the legislature or the monarch, the federal courts created by
the Framers drew their jurisdictional power directly from the Constitution itself.263
Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia submitted the plan that became the
working draft of the Convention with respect to the judicial branch.264 Randolph’s
proposal provided as follows:
[A] National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more
supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the
National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall
be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time
of such increase or diminution. That the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first instance,
and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier
resort, all piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an
enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the
collection of the National revenue; impeachments of any National
officers, and questions which may involve the national peace
and harmony.265
In addition to Randolph’s proposal, a competing judicial plan was offered by Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina.266 Though the Pinckney Plan was not nearly so influential
as the Virginia Plan, it is worth examining because it too gives some indication of
the range of viewpoints among the Founders concerning the issue of the source of
judicial power. Pinckney’s Plan provided as follows:
The Legislature of the United States shall have the Power & it
shall be their duty to establish such Courts of Law Equity & Admiralty as shall be necessary—the Judges of these Courts shall hold
their Offices during good behaviour & receive a compensation
which shall not be increased or diminished during their continuance in office—One of these Courts shall be termed the Supreme
Court whose Jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under
the laws of the United States or affecting ambassadors other public Ministers & Consuls—To the trial of impeachments of Officers of the United States—To all cases of Admiralty & maritime
263
264
265
266

Id. at 1647–48.
See 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 20–23.
See id. at 21–22.
Id. at 23.
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jurisdiction—In cases of impeachment affecting Ambassadors
& other public Ministers the Jurisdiction shall be original & in
all the other cases appellate—267
As is apparent, the most notable difference between the Pinckney and Randolph plans
was that Randolph eschewed the language of legislative supremacy whereas Pinckney
embraced it. Yet it was Randolph’s draft, not Pinckney’s, that the Convention, working through the Committee of the Whole,268 chose to use as the starting point in
formulating the general principles that would later animate that became Article III.
This choice is an important indication that the Framers, from the outset, understood
the judicial power to exist irrespective of what the legislature chose to do.
Two central principles regarding the judicial branch came to be regarded by the
Framers as indispensable. The first, agreed to by all members of the Convention, was
that the federal judiciary must be independent of the other branches.269 Indeed, it is fair
to say that almost all the debates that followed in the Convention centered on how
best to assure and protect this principle. In part, the principle of judicial independence was viewed as an end in itself; but in part, it was viewed as well as a means to
safeguard the second central principle, namely, the supremacy of federal law.270
During the course of the Convention, virtually all aspects of the federal judiciary
were debated and put to a vote.271 What I will focus on, however, are the issues that
shed light on whether the Framers regarded the judicial power as self-executing. In
this regard, it is useful initially to examine the debate over the council of revision.
The Virginia Plan made provisions for just such a council.272 The basic idea of the
proposal was that a group consisting of members from both the executive and
judicial branches would form a council that would review every legislative act prior
to its going into effect; the purpose of this review would be to evaluate the act’s
267

3 id. at 600. See generally id. at 595–609 (discussing the Pinckney Plan and the specific language it contained). Another plan was prepared by Alexander Hamilton, but was not
submitted to the floor of the convention. See id. at 617–30 (discussing Hamilton’s plan and
the specific language it contained). This plan was probably prepared in anticipation of a speech
delivered to the convention. See Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 761 & n.49.
268
The Convention quickly transferred all work to the Committee of the Whole to facilitate debate. See 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 29.
269
See Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 758. Alexander Hamilton believed that
judicial independence was “essential in a limited constitution.” See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78,
at 334 (Alexander Hamilton) (Thompson & Homans eds., 1831).
270
See Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 753–54 (“[T]he goal of assuring the
supremacy of federal law and the supremacy of the federal government in areas of concern
to more than one state was the central constitutional objective that the framers sought to
implement through article III.”).
271
For a chronological development of Article III through the Convention, see id. at
757–96.
272
See 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 21.
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constitutionality.273 As we know, the Framers ultimately rejected the inclusion of
any such council. Nevertheless, what the debates over this provision reveal is the
critical importance, in the estimation of both proponents and opponents of the council,
of judicial independence.274
For example, Elbridge Gerry opposed the council because he believed that a
governmental group comprising representatives from both the executive and judicial
branches would weaken the independence of the judiciary.275 Gerry and his allies
further argued that members of the judiciary should have no part in making laws they
might have to interpret.276 Likewise, Rufus King of Massachusetts believed that
“Judges ought to be able to expound the law as it should come before them, free from
the bias of having participated in its formation.”277 The overriding concern behind
these arguments was judicial independence; opponents of the council concluded that
the judicial branch, by cooperating with members of the other branches in enacting
legislation, would become entangled with those branches, and would thereby become less independent.
Those who supported the idea of the council did not value judicial independence
any less. On the contrary, their view (articulated, for example, by Wilson and Madison) was that, by participating in the legislative process, the judicial branch would
become stronger.278 Supporters believed that the power vested in the legislature was
273

The Virginia Plan provided for a council of revision. See id. Under this provision, “the
Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, [composed] a council of
revision with authority to examine every act of the National Legislature . . . .” Id. This
provision was first considered on June 4 by the Committee of the Whole. Id. at 96–103,
108–09. Later that day, Gerry’s proposal to delete the judiciary from the council of revision
was agreed to. Id. at 104. Though the subject was debated extensively throughout the Convention, the delegates never again included the judiciary in a revisory position.
Two days later, James Wilson, seconded by James Madison, moved that the judiciary
be included in the council of revision. Id. at 138. This attempt failed. Id. at 140. These same
proponents of the council of revision attempted its resurrection on at least two different
occasions. See 2 id. at 73–80, 298–302.
274
See Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 71–77 (discussing the drafting of the
judicial article at the convention).
275
See 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 75 (comments by E. Gerry); id. at 76
(comments by L. Martin).
276
See id. at 76–79.
277
1 id. at 98. A similar point was again made by Gerry and Caleb Strong. 2 id. at 75; see
also id. at 298 (comments by C. Pinckney). Proponents of the council of revision responded
that this was not improper because judges in England often had a hand in molding legislation. Id. at 75 (comments by G. Morris).
278
See 1 id. at 98 (comments by J. Wilson favoring the involvement of the executive and
judiciary in an absolute negative on legislative act); 2 id. at 73, 300–01 (comments by J.
Wilson), 74–75 (comments by J. Madison), 75–76, 299–300 (comments by G. Morris). Additional arguments in favor of the council of revision were that it would instill confidence in
the executive and would give Congress additional insight into the nature and consistency of
the laws they passed. See id. at 74 (comments by J. Madison).
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so vast, that judicial participation in legislation would be one means to check that
legislative dominance.279 Others, including most notably Alexander Hamilton,
argued that judicial review would provide a sufficient check on the abuse of legislative power.280
Although the issue of self-execution was not specifically touched on in these
debates regarding the council of revision, the Framers without recorded exception
appear to have assumed that the federal courts would exist and exercise power
irrespective of congressional action; they regarded the judiciary as springing into
existence once the Constitution was ratified, just as they viewed the legislative and
executive branches as springing into existence. In fact, in one crucial exchange,
proponents of the council argued that the council might be necessary in order to prevent Congress from enacting measures that would immediately truncate federal
jurisdiction.281 This argument by the proponents is telling because it assumed federal
courts would possess their power immediately upon creation and that Congress
might thereafter attempt to circumscribe that power. Although this concern reveals
nothing about whether such congressional action would be permissible, it does
demonstrate that these same Framers assumed the judicial branch would acquire its
power directly from the Constitution, without the need for congressional enactment.
Further, in answering this argument, opponents of the council likewise assumed that
the federal courts would possess jurisdictional power directly by virtue of the Constitution, but they concluded that the history of the relationship between the judicial and
legislative branches in England demonstrated that a council was unnecessary in order
for the judges to be able to preserve their power against congressional invasion.282
279

Madison asserted that even with the disputed alignment of the executive and the
judicial branches, “the Legislature would still be an overmatch for them.” Id. at 74.
280
See 1 id. at 97–98 (comments by E. Gerry); 2 id. at 76 (comments by L. Martin). This
power of the judiciary to protect itself by use of powers inherent in its institution was
subsequently developed and defended by Alexander Hamilton. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78,
supra note 269, at 336–37 (Alexander Hamilton). Nevertheless, while others may have also
held his view, some Framers clearly did not. See, e.g., 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254,
at 298–99 (comments by J. Mercer and J. Dickenson).
281
2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 74 (comments by J. Madison).
282
See id. at 73 (comments by N. Ghorum that “Judges in England have no such additional provision for their defence, yet their jurisdiction is not invaded”). Proponents of the
council believed that the power of judicial review, while potent, was not potent enough.
Thus, James Wilson argued:
Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing
to give them effect. Let them have a share in the Revisionary power,
and they will have an opportunity of taking notice of these characters
of a law, and of counteracting, by the weight of their opinions the improper views of the Legislature.
Id. Moreover, as I indicate above, Wilson was probably influenced by the Scottish experience, where the courts were more independent of legislative control than was the case in
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A second subject debated at the Convention which sheds some light on the issue
of self-execution dealt with the role of inferior federal courts. Before examining this
complicated subject, however, an important caveat is in order. At least four contemporary constitutional questions were adumbrated in the debates surrounding inferior
federal courts. The first deals with the power of Congress to control the subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts; the second deals with whether Congress was
constitutionally required to create any inferior federal courts at all; the third deals
with the question of so-called parity between state and federal courts; the fourth
deals with the present subject, self-execution. Although each of the first three issues
mentioned may have some connection to the matter of self-execution, the four issues
are conceptually distinct from one another. For example, it would be coherent to say
that Congress has the power to decline to create any inferior federal courts at all and
also to say that if Congress does create them, their power derives directly from the
Constitution. Further, in view of the fact that at least three different questions debated at the Convention in the context of inferior federal courts, there is a danger
presented of simply transposing a statement made in one context to an entirely
different one. With these concerns in mind, we can examine the debates surrounding
the issue of inferior courts.
The Virginia Plan as originally proposed did not contain an explicit requirement
that inferior courts be established; the matter was left to the discretion of Congress.283
However, during the June 4 voting, the Convention mandated the creation of inferior
courts.284 The next day, John Rutledge moved that this provision for inferior courts
be removed. After debate, the convention voted to remove the provision.285 This
development prompted Madison and Wilson to offer a compromise that would reinstate Congress’s discretion over whether to create inferior courts.286 This Madisonian
compromise was incorporated into Article III.
Commentators who argue that Congress has strong control over federal jurisdiction—including, perhaps most notably, Professor Bator—have viewed this
England. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 55, at 1625–42 (discussing the Scottish influence
on early American formation of the federal judiciary). Madison made similar comments
about the council of revision. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 74 (“It would moreover
be useful to the Community at large as an additional check ag[ainst] a pursuit of those unwise & unjust measures which constituted so great a portion of our calamities.”). Madison,
of course, was also influenced by the Scottish experience. See WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA,
supra note 212; Pfander & Birk, supra note 55, at 1625 & nn.54–55.
283
See 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 21. The Pinckney Plan also did not provide
for inferior courts. See 3 id. at 600.
284
See 1 id. at 95, 104. After the vote, the plan provided “that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one supreme tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals.” Id. at 104.
285
See id. at 125.
286
See id. at 124–25. The Framers who supported the existence of inferior courts believed
that fixing their number in the Constitution would be inexpedient and cumbersome as the
new nation grew and circumstances changed. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 349
(Alexander Hamilton) (Thompson & Homans eds., 1831).
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compromise as the source of Congress’s jurisdictional power over inferior courts.287
At the risk of unnecessary repetition, however, it is worth emphasizing that this
conclusion is not originalist; it is grounded not on anything the Framers themselves
said about the source of the judicial power to hear cases, but rather it is grounded
entirely on the “greater includes the lesser” argument (which, as I have shown, is
subject to a variety of both historical and analytical critiques).
In short, despite the conventional wisdom’s conflation of the two, the issue of
congressional control over inferior federal court jurisdiction is distinct from the
question of self-execution. Nevertheless, several of the issues presented by the
debate over Congress’s power to control federal court jurisdiction are sufficiently
related to the self-execution question as to merit brief attention.
Before turning to the specifics of the debate at the Constitutional Convention
over what eventually became the Exceptions Clause, it is worth noting that the entire
topic occupies less than two full pages in Farrand’s reports of the Constitutional
Convention.288 There is, in other words, very little source material that directly illuminates this precise issue—which could of course mean that the issue was obvious, or
even that the Framers did not deem it to be particularly important. In any case,
because the two pages have spawned so much contemporary analysis, I set out the
relevant passages from Madison’s notes in full:
Mr. Rutlidge havg. obtained a rule for reconsideration of the
clause for establishing inferior tribunals under the national
authority, now moved that that part of the clause <in propos. 9.>
should be expunged: arguing that the State Tribunals might and
ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance the
right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient
to secure the national rights & uniformity of Judgmts: that it was
making an unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdiction <of the
States,> and creating unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of
the new system.—<Mr. Sherman 2ded. the motion.>
Mr. <Madison> observed that unless inferior tribunals were
dispersed throughout the Republic with final jurisdiction in
many cases, appeals would be multiplied to a most oppressive
degree; that besides, an appeal would not in many cases be a
remedy. What was to be done after improper Verdicts in State
tribunals obtained under the biassed directions of a dependent
Judge, or the local prejudices of an undirected jury? To remand
the cause for a new trial would answer no purpose. To order a
287
288

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 124–25.
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new trial at the supreme bar would oblige the parties to bring up
their witnesses, tho’ ever so distant from the seat of the Court.
An effective Judiciary establishment commensurate to the legislative authority, was essential. A Government without a proper
Executive & Judiciary would be the mere trunk of a body without arms or legs to act or move.
Mr. Wilson opposed the motion on like grounds. he said the
admiralty jurisdiction ought to be given wholly to the national
Government, as it related to cases not within the jurisdiction of
particular states, & to a scene in which controversies with foreigners would be most likely to happen.
Mr. Sherman was in favor of the motion. He dwelt chiefly
on the supposed expensiveness of having a new set of Courts,
when the existing State Courts would answer the same purpose.
Mr. Dickinson contended strongly that if there was to be a
National Legislature, there ought to be a national Judiciary, and
that the former ought to have authority to institute the latter.
On the question for Mr. Rutlidge’s motion to strike out “inferior tribunals”
Massts. divided, Cont. ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo ay. [Ayes—5; noes—4;
divided—2.]
Mr. Wilson & Mr. Madison then moved, in pursuance of the
idea expressed above by Mr. Dickinson, to add to Resol: 9. the
words following “that the National Legislature be empowered to
institute inferior tribunals”. They observed that there was a
distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and
giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not establish
them. They repeated the necessity of some such provision.
Mr. Butler. The people will not bear such innovations. The
States will revolt at such encroachments. Supposing such an
establishment to be useful, we must not venture on it. We must
follow the example of Solon who gave the Athenians not the
best Govt. he could devise; but the best they wd. receive.
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Mr. King remarked as to the comparative expence that the
establishment of inferior tribunals wd. cost infinitely less than
the appeals that would be prevented by them.
On this question as moved by Mr. W. and Mr. M.
Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md.
ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [Ayes—8; noes—2;
divided—1.]289
Despite the efforts of contemporary theorists to locate, in this transcription, a
source for the conclusion that Congress has the power to control federal court jurisdiction, neither the word “jurisdiction” nor the concept of judicial power is referred
to by the Framers at all. Further, it is clear that none of the Framers explicitly assumed
that the power to control jurisdiction is a lesser power included in the greater one to
control the creation of a federal court in the first instance, and the Framers’ refusal
to indulge in such a presumption was quite sound. Indeed, the power to control jurisdiction may in fact be the greater power, with the power to control the creation of the
court being lesser. The reason this is so is that if Congress took no action at all to
create lower federal courts, various types of cases would be heard in the first
instance in state courts. Therefore, in order to protect federal power vis-à-vis the
states, Congress might prefer to create lower federal courts so as to remove certain
matters from the control or influence of state judiciaries. The power to control which
cases the federal courts can hear (vis-à-vis the states) would vest Congress with the
power to allocate certain heads of jurisdiction between state and federal judiciaries.
That power would manifestly be “greater” than the power simply to “turn on” the
federal courts. Or, to return to my analogy: someone who has a light switch has
power only over whether the lights are on or off; one who has a rheostat has power
over not only whether they are on or off, but also over when they are on and how
brightly they burn. Giving Congress a rheostat would be giving it more power than
merely handing it an on-off switch.
289
Id. at 124–25 (footnotes omitted). Dickinson’s statement might be construed to entail
a latent jurisdictional power, but it does not explicitly do so. Given the tenor of the debate,
one would be hard pressed to read into the provision ultimately agreed to such an expansive
congressional power.
Professor Clinton’s liberal inference from these notes is typical. Initially he seems to
acknowledge that the Madisonian compromise does not by its terms give Congress power
to control jurisdiction. See Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 766 (“It seems, therefore that the framers did not assume that with the power to establish inferior federal courts
necessarily went the power to control their jurisdiction.”). Yet he later asserts that the creation
power does contain a jurisdictional power over inferior court jurisdiction. See id. at 822 (“It
is evident from this discussion that the congressional discretion over whether to create inferior federal courts and, if created, the power over the scope of their jurisdiction was almost
universally assumed and applauded by the federalists.”). He offers no support for this claim.
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Given the paucity of support for the conventional wisdom in Madison’s notes,
it is not surprising that defenders of the current orthodoxy have an alternative basis
for their conclusion, and that alternative basis is to look to the contemporary practices in the states. And indeed, state legislatures did in fact keep tight controls over
their respective judicial branches by controlling the state judiciary’s jurisdiction.290
But the notion that the Framers desired to copy the state mechanisms is not especially persuasive; on the contrary, the Framers were committed to correcting perceived defects in the states,291 and one of those defects was an accumulation of
excessive power in state legislatures. Consequently, the fact that state legislatures
could exercise potent control over their own judiciaries, rather than being a reason
to believe that the Framers vested the Congress with this same power, is precisely
a reason to think that they did not. What the Framers cared about above all else was
judicial independence, and what they would have known from observing state
judiciaries is that they lacked independence precisely because they were subject to
excessive legislative control.292 In fact, to the extent we can reliably draw any conclusions from what the Framers did not do, the fact that they rejected an anti-federalist
proposal to give Congress significant power over the lower federal courts—a power
similar to the one state legislatures exercised over their own courts—suggests the
Framers were repudiating the dominant paradigm, not replicating it.293
Although, as I have indicated, the lower federal courts did not receive a great
deal of attention from the Framers at the convention, the Supreme Court did. In part,
the Framers apparently regarded the issues surrounding the lower federal courts, if
not those courts themselves, as less important than the Supreme Court; and in part,
the Framers had a highly instrumental vision for the lower federal courts—regarding
them as necessary and valuable primarily because they would ease the appellate load
of the Supreme Court.294
290

See Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 814 & n.233.
As discussed above, though some states employed measures to ensure judicial independence, such independence was largely illusory because of legislative tampering with jurisdiction.
292
See Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 814 & n.233.
293
An explicit provision giving Congress plenary power over inferior court jurisdiction
was added to the draft of the Constitution reported out of the Committee of Detail. See 2
Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 186. The Committee report provided that “[t]he Legislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction above mentioned (except the trial of the President
of the United States) in the manner, and under the limitations which it shall think proper, to
such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute from time to time.” Id. at 186–87. What seems more
important than the fact this proposal was offered is that it went nowhere. It was not included
in either the report of the Committee of the Whole or the report submitted by the Convention
to the Committee of Detail. See 1 id. at 132–33; 2 id. at 231. Moreover, this report was
probably strongly influenced by Edmund Randolph’s attempts to limit federal jurisdiction—a
battle he fought at the Convention and lost. See 2 id. at 430.
294
See 1 id. at 124 (comments by J. Madison); 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 243, at 553
(comments by J. Marshall) (asserting that inferior federal courts were “necessary to the
perfection of the system”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 286, at 349 (Alexander
291
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In fact, to the extent the Framers explicitly considered curtailing the jurisdiction
of any court, they did so when debating the Supreme Court—not, however, because
they wanted to micromanage or prevent that Court from addressing matters of national
importance, but instead because they believed some potentially federal questions
were insufficiently important for the high Court.295 Basically, the Framers were content
to leave the more insignificant cases to the inferior courts for final determination, and
they considered achieving this objective through the exercise of the exceptions and
regulations power.296 One idea was that state courts would decide certain matters in
the first instance with final appeal lying to a lower federal court. As Hamilton wrote:
The plan of the convention, in the first place, authorizes the
national legislature “to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.” It declares, in the next place, that “the JUDICIAL
POWER of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress shall ordain and
establish”; and it then proceeds to enumerate the cases to which
this judicial power shall extend. It afterwards divides the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court into original and appellate, but gives
no definition of that of the subordinate courts. The only outlines
described for them are that they shall be “inferior to the Supreme
Court,” and that they shall not exceed the specified limits of the
federal judiciary. Whether their authority shall be original or appellate, or both, is not declared. All this seems to be left to the
discretion of the legislature. And this being the case, I perceive
at present no impediment to the establishment of an appeal from
the State courts to the subordinate national tribunals; and many
advantages attending the power of doing it may be imagined. It
would diminish the motives to the multiplication of federal courts
and would admit of arrangements calculated to contract the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The State tribunals may
then be left with a more entire charge of federal causes; and appeals, in most cases in which they may be deemed proper, instead
of being carried to the Supreme Court may be made to lie from
the State courts to district courts of the Union.297
Hamilton) (“The power of constituting inferior courts is evidently calculated to obviate the
necessity of having recourse to the Supreme Court, in every case of federal cognizance.”);
see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra note 210, at 355–56 (Alexander Hamilton).
295
THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra note 210, at 355–56 (Alexander Hamilton).
296
See id. The Exceptions and Regulations Clause made its first appearance in the draft
reported out of the Committee of Detail. See 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 186.
297
THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra note 210, at 355–56 (Alexander Hamilton); see also
13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 552–53 (John
P. Kaminski ed., 1981) (response of R. King and N. Gorham to E. Gerry’s objections).
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As Hamilton’s comment reveals, the idea here is that the Exceptions Clause would
allow Congress to save the Supreme Court from being overburdened; Congress would
do so by limiting the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to cases of significant
federal interest,298 giving the lower federal courts the final authority to review other
(comparatively less important) state court decisions involving federal questions.
At no point during the debates in the Convention, however, did any Framer
indicate in any way that Congress’s exceptions and regulations power was sufficiently potent as to allow Congress to restrict the overall scope of federal jurisdiction, especially the “arising under” jurisdiction.299 Indeed, the best conclusion that
can be drawn from the Framers’ view of the utility of lower federal courts is that
they believed the “arising under” jurisdiction must be heard by a federal court at some
point during the litigation of the issue.
Madison himself proposed the language that ultimately became the “arising
under” jurisdictional provision of Article III.300 Madison’s viewpoint, apparently
shared by all the delegates, was that, with respect to subject matter, the judicial power
should be coterminous with the legislative power.301 Consequently, if the legislature
could act in an area, the judicial power necessarily reached that area as well. Reliance on either the executive alone or judicial review by state courts was deemed an
insufficient safeguard of federal law. The Framers lacked confidence in state courts
not only because of potential conflicts between state and national sovereigns (a fear
which generated the Supremacy Clause), but also because state judges, unlike the
plan for Article III judges, were generally subject to political pressures.302 The federal
courts, therefore, were also expected to test state laws against the Constitution.
298

See 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 243, at 534 (comments by J. Madison). As a corollary
to this power to protect the Supreme Court’s integrity, the Framers gave Congress the power
to shift appellate authority to inferior courts to reduce the burden on the parties. This power
ensured that parties would not be subjected to vexatious appeals requiring them to travel
great distances. See id. at 534 (comments by J. Madison), 547 (comments by E. Pendleton
that inferior courts “may be accommodated to public convenience and utility”).
299
See Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 776–77 (“These later drafts [of the
Constitution] omit, however, any explicit grant of congressional power over the scope of
federal court/jurisdiction.”).
300
He proposed the language on July 18. See 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 46
(providing that “the jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under the Nat’l laws: And
to such other questions as may involve the Nat’l, peace & harmony”). On August 27, this
jurisdiction was extended to cases arising under the Constitution and to cases arising under
“treaties made or which shall be made under their authority.” Id. at 431.
301
See generally Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254.
302
See 2 id. at 54 (comments by J. Madison rejecting the use of force to enforce federal
law); 1 id. at 124 (comments by J. Madison); 2 id. at 28 (comment by G. Morris). During the
debate on whether Congress should be vested with a negative on all state laws, it was suggested that federal courts would be sufficient for this purpose. 2 id. at 28–29. At this time
Luther Martin suggested a supremacy clause to ensure state court compliance with federal
law. Id. This clause was agreed to and was the forerunner to the Supremacy Clause included in
Article VI. Id. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 286, at 349 (Alexander Hamilton).
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As discussed briefly above, the jurisdictional menu in Article III received significant attention from the Framers.303 Initially, work in the Committee of the Whole
and on the convention floor centered around defining the general principles that
would animate federal jurisdiction.304 The report submitted to the Committee of
Detail did just this,305 and it was left to this committee to hammer out the details of
federal jurisdiction.306 Its work went through several steps and ultimately produced
a jurisdictional menu similar to the one contained in Article III. The report which
emerged from the committee provided as follows:
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all
cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the United
States; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of Officers of the
United States; to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between two or more States, (except such
as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction) between a State and
Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States,
and between a State or the Citizens thereof and foreign States,
citizens or subjects. In cases of impeachment, cases affecting
Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original. In
all the other cases before mentioned, it shall be appellate, with
such exceptions and under such regulations as the Legislature
shall make. The Legislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction above mentioned (except the trial of the President of the
United States) in the manner, and under the limitations which it
shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute
from time to time.307
Finally, on August 27, the Convention worked out the remaining details of federal
jurisdiction to arrive at what is currently in the Constitution.308
Evidence pertaining to the issue of the legislature’s power to control federal jurisdiction is sparse, but not non-existent. For example, on two separate occasions,
Edmund Randolph proposed that the legislature has the power to control the scope
of the federal courts’ jurisdiction, but both proposals failed.309 In addition, a draft
303
304
305
306
307
308
309

See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
See 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 211, 223, 230–32, 238; 2 id. at 39.
See 2 id. at 132–33.
See Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 37, at 772.
2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 186–87.
See id. at 428–31.
See id. at 146–47, 431.
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contained in the working papers of the Committee of Detail contained a provision
that would have allowed Congress to assign to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction cases
“involving the national peace and harmony.”310 This provision, of course, deals with
congressional augmentation of federal jurisdiction (as distinguished from congressional circumscription), but it too failed to be included in the final committee draft.311
Randolph’s second attempt to include an explicit provision granting Congress a
broad jurisdictional power was offered on August 27, the same date the Convention
finalized the jurisdiction menu in Article III.312 This attempt also failed.313 The
failure of the Framers to include an explicit provision for a jurisdictional power,
even though one was offered on at least two different occasions, strongly suggests
that the Framers did not intend for Congress to have such a power.314 Moreover, the
310

See id. at 147. This provision would have extended the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to:
such other cases, as the national legislature may assign, as involving
the national peace and harmony, in the collection of the revenue in
disputes between citizens of different states <in disputes between a
State & a Citizen or Citizens of another State> in disputes between
different states; and in disputes, in which subjects or citizens of other
countries are concerned <& in Cases of Admiralty Jurisdn> . . . .
Id. (emphasis added). The appearance of this provision, coupled with Randolph’s later
criticisms of federal court jurisdiction, may explain the jurisdiction limiting provisions in the
final committee draft. See id. at 186–87. As discussed above, the committee limited the
jurisdictional menu to the Supreme Court and provided an assignment clause that presumably
gave Congress wide discretion over inferior court jurisdiction. This dynamic suggests that
the committee initially intended the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to be self-executing, while
leaving the jurisdiction of the inferior courts to the discretion of Congress. However, the later
extension of federal jurisdiction to the federal judiciary as a whole and the contemporary
deletion of the assignment clause strongly suggest that this distinction evaporated in the
minds of the Framers. See id. at 431.
311
See id. at 186 (showing the lack of a phrase regarding “national peace and harmony”).
312
See id. at 430. Because this vote seems rather important, I set out the notes concerning
it below:
Mr. Madison & Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out the beginning
of the 3d sect. “The jurisdiction of the supreme Court” & to insert the
words “the Judicial power” which was agreed to nem: con:
The following motion was disagreed to, to wit to insert “In all the
other cases before mentioned the Judicial power shall be exercised in
such manner as the Legislature shall direct” <Del. Virga ay
N. H Con. P. M. S. C. G no> [Ayes—2; noes—6.]
On a question for striking out the last sentence of sect. 3. “The
Legislature may assign &c—”
N. H. ay—Ct ay. Pa. ay. Del—ay—Md ay—Va ay—S—C. ay—
Geo. ay. [Ayes—8; noes—0.]
Id. at 431 (footnotes omitted).
313
See id.
314
Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 639 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
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timing of this decision by the Framers is also suggestive: By refusing to include an
explicit jurisdictional power in favor of Congress immediately after taking action
to specify the federal courts’ entire jurisdictional menu suggests that the Framers
understood the jurisdictional grant to flow directly from the Constitution to the federal
judiciary without the need for any congressional action. This unanimous vote to defeat
the assignment clause indicates the Framers understood that inferior federal courts, like
the Supreme Court, draw their jurisdictional power directly from the Constitution.
Finally, as indicated above, the committee’s original proposal contained a specific menu pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court while leaving the
jurisdictional ambit of the inferior federal courts to the discretion of Congress. In
subsequent drafts, however, and in the Constitution itself, the jurisdictional menu
delineated in Article III is extended to the federal courts simpliciter, without distinguishing between the Supreme and inferior federal courts.315 The transformation
from the committee’s initial proposal to the Constitution’s ultimate form suggests
that the Framers rejected the notion that the Supreme Court’s power would be selfexecuting while that of the lower federal courts would require congressional action.
The most sensible understanding of what transpired in the convention is that the
Framers intended the federal judiciary to possess a self-executing “arising under”
jurisdiction. Congress was not without enormous power, however. For Congress
could choose either to create inferior courts or not to. Once created, however, these
inferior courts derived their jurisdictional capacity directly from the Constitution.316
F. The Ratification Debates
Much of what transpired at state ratification conventions also suggests that
delegates to those conventions understood the Article III jurisdictional grant to be
self-executing. Although the issue of whether enabling legislation was required to
trigger the federal courts’ power was apparently not addressed directly in any of the
state assemblies, debates concerning two other issues provide some illumination.
One issue dealt with whether the extension of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to fact questions obviated the use of juries; a second matter concerned whether
the heads of jurisdiction, in conjunction with the creation of inferior courts, obliterated
concurring) (observing that a considered congressional decision not to vest the Executive
with a particular power is tantamount to a denial of that power).
315
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
316
The self-executing thesis proposed here, coupled with the mandatory creation thesis
of Amar and Clinton, implies that Congress could except only insignificant federal cases away
from the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. These cases might involve limited subject
matters and require some minimum amount in controversy, but cases involving an important
federal interest, such as cases involving the construction of the Constitution, could not be
excepted. Limiting all of Congress’s powers over the federal judiciary to a facilitative means,
as opposed to a destructive one, best supports the independent judiciary the Framers intended
to create.
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state judiciaries. Each of these debates reveals important aspects of the contemporary view toward self-execution.
To begin with the issue of juries, most of the opposition in the states to the judiciary article centered on the absence of a provision guaranteeing juries in civil cases
(a concern later addressed by the Seventh Amendment).317 This fear was further
exacerbated by the extension of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to facts as well
as law.318 This fear led the proponents of the judiciary article to an interesting interpretation of Congress’s exceptions and regulations power: They asserted that because civil
juries varied from state to state, and because a precise constitutional provision was
therefore impossible,319 Congress could, through the exceptions and regulations clause,
protect jury decisions by limiting Supreme Court review of facts in these cases.320
This interpretation of Congress’s power offered in some states’ ratifying conventions was consistent with the intention of the Framers at the Constitutional
Convention. As will be recalled, the exceptions and regulations clause was designed
to protect the integrity (i.e., independence) of the Supreme Court (and, to a lesser
extent, to protect the parties to a case).321 A mere shifting of the Supreme Court’s
review of fact questions would not violate this limited purpose. Consequently, the
debate over juries revealed a view of Cfongress’s Exceptions Clause power that was
highly circumscribed, and there is no indication from the state conventions that
317

See, e.g., 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 243, at 540 (comments by P. Henry); 3 Farrand,
RECORDS, supra note 254, at 156 (comments by L. Martin).
318
See 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 243, at 528 (comments by G. Mason), 540 (comments
by P. Henry), 568 (comments by W. Grayson).
319
See 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 628; 3 id. at 150 (comments by J. McHenry);
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 52–53 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
1888 & republished 1968) [hereinafter Ford, PAMPHLETS] (comments by N. Webster).
320
See, e.g., 2 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 243, at 495 (comments by J. Wilson); 3 id. at
520 (comments by E. Pendleton), 534 (comments by J. Madison), 560 (comments by J.
Marshall), 572 (comments by E. Randolph). Several commentators have suggested that the
exceptions and regulations clause is limited to the restriction of fact, and not law. See, e.g.,
Irving Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional Abuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53 OR.
L. REV. 3 (1973) (arguing “the sole purpose of the Exceptions Clause was to permit Congress
to limit appellate jurisdiction over questions of fact in cases at law”); Henry J. Merry, Scope
of the Supreme Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. REV. 53, 61
(1962) (“This suggests that in common law areas, the Supreme Court would consider issues
of law and in other areas . . . the Court would review issues of fact.”). Although the “law and
fact” clause was inserted long after the exceptions and regulations clause, this interpretation
is not so far fetched given the tenor of the debate over its insertion and the nature of appeals
in the late eighteenth century. See 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 431. The addition
of “law and fact” was more in the nature of a clarification, rather than a substantive addition.
Id. However, none of the debates over the exceptions and regulations clause, though suggesting the feasibility of this power to restrict Supreme Court review of fact, necessarily limit
it to this interpretation.
321
See Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 319, at 238 (comments by A. Hanson on the jurisdiction of federal judiciaries).
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anyone believed Congress could safeguard the right to trial by jury by declining to
vest the Court with subject matter jurisdiction.
Another area of concern in the ratification process was whether the federal
judiciary would eclipse the state judiciaries.322 Advocates of a robust federal judiciary argued that the broad jurisdictional grant encompassed by the “arising under”
language was necessary to ensure enforcement of the legislative powers,323 but these
proponents of a strong federal judiciary were sensitive to the concern that state
courts could be threatened, so they emphasized that state court jurisdiction was left
untouched and that the “arising under” grant occupied a separate sphere of concern
from those protected by the state courts.324
Yet not all those with anti-federalist views were persuaded. Edmund Randolph,
for example, continuing the position he had staked out at the Constitutional Convention, asserted that an expansive interpretation of the “arising under” jurisdictional
grant—especially if it encompassed all constitutional issues—would swallow the
jurisdiction of the state courts.325 The kind of fears expressed by Randolph and
322

See, e.g., id. at 329–30 (comments by G. Mason) (“The judiciary of the United States
is so constructed and extended, as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several states;
thereby rendering laws as tedious, intricate, and expensive, and justice as unattainable by a
great part of the community, as in England; and enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the
poor.”). However, James Madison asserted that:
[T]he far greater number of causes—out of a hundred—will remain
with the state judiciaries. All controversies directly between citizen and
citizen will still remain with the local courts. The number of cases within
the jurisdiction of these courts is very small when compared to those
in which the local tribunals will have cognizance.
3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 243, at 538.
323
See 2 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 243, at 469 (comments by J. Wilson) (“I believe [the
judicial power] ought to be coextensive; otherwise, laws would be framed that could not be
executed.”).
324
See 3 id. at 532 (comments by J. Madison), 548 (comments by E. Pendleton), 553
(comments by J. Marshall), 570 (comments by E. Randolph); 4 id. at 145 (comments by J.
Iredell), 156 (comments by W. Davie).
325
See 3 id. at 572; 3 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 254, at 310 (“The judiciary is drawn
up in terror—here I have an objection of a different nature.”). Though Edmund Randolph
generally supported “arising under” jurisdiction, he feared the ambiguity of extending this
jurisdiction to cases arising under the Constitution.
It extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution.
What are these cases of law and equity? Do they not involve all rights,
from an inchoate right to a complete right, arising from this Constitution?
Notwithstanding the contempt gentlemen express for technical terms,
I wish such were mentioned here. I would have thought it more safe,
if it had been more clearly expressed. What do we mean by the words
arising under the Constitution? What do they relate to? I conceive this
to be very ambiguous. If my interpretation be right, the word arising
will be carried so far that it will be made use of to aid and extend the
federal jurisdiction.
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others, coupled with the claim made by defenders of the strong federal judiciary that
state courts would continue to possess most all the jurisdiction that they traditionally
enjoyed, suggest two things: First, as the conventional jurisdictional wisdom recognizes, the “arising under” clause must be read with federalism concerns in mind; that
is, for a case to “arise under” the Constitution, the balance of issues in a particular
case must be sufficiently federal to merit federal court consideration.326 Second,
Congress would have no role in protecting a separate sphere for state judiciaries,
because the Constitution itself both empowered the federal courts but also preserved
a wide realm for the state courts to operate.
***
The debates over the exceptions and regulations clause and the scope of federal
jurisdiction reveal that the Framers intended a jurisdiction that was self-executing,
and that their intention was correctly apprehended both by defenders of a strong
federal judicial branch as well as its opponents. There are few if any contemporary
expressions from either federalists or anti-federalists that Congress’s Exceptions
Clause power would empower the legislature to control or circumscribe jurisdiction
conferred by the constitutional grant. On the contrary, all contemporary indications
are that the Exceptions Clause was a power that would permit Congress to ensure
effective and efficient exercise of the judicial power. And, as the debates over the
fate of state court judiciaries illuminate, one reason that the idea of self-execution
caused no alarm is that the federal courts’ power over issues centrally involving
federal questions—and constitutional questions in particular—did not threaten the
traditional domains served by state courts.
CONCLUSION: THE CONTEMPORARY EMBEDDEDNESS OF A WRONG IDEA, AND A
NARROWER CONCEPTION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,327 Justice Brennan chastised Justice Scalia
for not acknowledging that the “Judiciary Act merely gave effect to the grant of
3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 243, at 572. Of course his interpretation proved to be right.
John Marshall, a fellow member at the Virginia ratification convention and who probably
heard these remarks, eventually gave this phrase the most expansive interpretation possible.
See Osborn v. President of the Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824); supra
note 243 and accompanying text. This makes sense in the world of John Marshall, however.
Instead of reading the “arising under” grant as containing a constitutional limitation to be
interpreted by the courts, he believed in an equally extensive power vested in Congress to
limit the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary.
326
See, e.g., Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117 (1936) (“What is needed is something of that common-sense accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which
characterizes the law in its treatment of problems of causation.”).
327
491 U.S. 1 (1989).

2016]

IS THE “ARISING UNDER” GRANT SELF-EXECUTING?

61

federal-question jurisdiction under Article III, which was not self-executing.”328 This
proposition was so obvious, it required no citation.329 As I have argued, however,
what has long seemed obvious turns out to be wrong.
The self-executing model I suggest is more faithful to the historical record, the
Framers’ intent, and the system of checks-and-balances. A federal court tasked with
ascertaining its power to hear a dispute would proceed rather differently than it does
currently. A federal court examining its own power to adjudicate a dispute would address all aspects of justiciability.330 The court would therefore ask whether the party
suffered some injury and has standing to seek redress, whether the Constitution
provides protection from that injury, and whether it provides some sort of remedy
that the court can grant.331 Nothing in my argument would get in the way of the
court’s inquiry into questions like ripeness, mootness, and political question. All
these inquiries reflect the need to ascertain the existence of the essential ingredients
that comprise a constitutional “case.”332 The court’s focus, however, would be entirely
on the constitutional language. What a federal court would not do is seek to ascertain
whether Congress intended in § 1331 to create federal jurisdiction over the dispute.
Nevertheless, even under a self-executing paradigm, Congress will continue to retain significant power to shape federal jurisdiction in other domains, including federalism cases (i.e., cases involving the boundary between federal versus state authority),
as well as ostensibly federal-question cases that turn on whether Congress has entered a field, whether its actions are sufficient to establish a federal concern, and so
on. In these and perhaps other similar cases, Congress will retain the power to
influence the issue of whether federal-question jurisdiction is present. In addition,
in exercising its Article I powers, Congress may take advantage of the constitutional
“case” limitation on the federal judiciary by directing which government instrumentality may enforce its laws. It can do so by determining which laws create justiciable

328

Id. at 19.
Id.
330
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 39–166 (1994) (discussing
both constitutional and prudential limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, including
doctrines of standing, ripeness, mootness, and political question). I have elsewhere argued
against the concept of prudential limits on standing. See David R. Dow, Standing and Rights,
36 EMORY L.J. 1195 (1987).
331
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389 (1971).
332
When the Framers extended the judicial power to “cases,” they principally meant to
limit the actions that federal courts can take. See WRIGHT, supra note 57, at 53–59. One
example of this limitation is the principle that federal courts may not issue advisory opinions.
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96–97 (1968). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 330,
at 43–48. The Framers clearly intended that the federal courts not engage in this type of
activity by defeating several proposals to include the Supreme Court in a council of revision.
See supra notes 213–18, 220 and accompanying text.
329
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causes of action upon which federal courts may act.333 This provision provides Congress
an important power over federal courts. It allows Congress, for example, to establish
specialized Article I courts334 and otherwise to determine how its laws are enforced.335
Finally, Congress will also continue to possess two powers over federal jurisdiction explicitly granted by the Constitution. First, the Necessary and Proper Clause
gives Congress power to pass all laws “which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution . . . all other powers vested by this Constitution.”336 Congress
may therefore pass laws that facilitate the execution of the judicial power even if
those laws affect the scope of federal jurisdiction. This power (which probably includes, for example, the ability to create amount in controversy limitations for federal question cases),337 however, is merely protective and facilitative of the judicial
333
The distinction between justiciability and jurisdiction is different from the test for
“arising under” jurisdiction posited by Justice Holmes. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne
& Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (“A suit arises under the law that creates the cause
of action.”). Congress undoubtedly has the power to pass laws which confer special rights
and which, when violated, become part of a cause of action justiciable in a federal court.
Causes of action, however, may contain many elements, some of which arise under the laws
of the United States. A well-known axiom of “arising under” jurisprudence is that federal law
may be part of a cause of action though it does not create that cause of action. See Smith v.
Kan. City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921).
334
Of course, these principles are subject to the limitations of the Northern Pipeline
progeny. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 458 U.S. 50, 62 (1982); HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 425–65. The basic and essential rule of this line of cases is that
an appeal must be allowed to an Article III court. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 87. This rule preserves the principle of separated powers inherent in our constitutional system. However, it
still allows Congress wide latitude to determine how its laws and regulations are enforced in the
first instance and permits Congress to determine how issues are to be presented to federal courts.
335
The power to pass laws while manipulating the “case” limitation of Article III also allows
Congress to direct enforcement power to specialized Article III courts. See, e.g., Lockerty
v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187–89 (1943) (upholding a legislative scheme that directed challenges to price controls to a special Emergency Court of Appeals with appeal to the Supreme
Court). The Price Control cases addressed challenges to the constitutionality of price controls
set on commodities during World War II. Id. at 184. Though the Court upheld the statutory
scheme and dismissed the cases for lack of jurisdiction, it indirectly addressed the constitutional issue raised. Id. at 187–89. It held that the legislation provided the complainants with
their procedural due process rights under the Constitution. Id. Because the legislation passed
constitutional muster, it did not present the Court with a justiciable case; the statute conferred
only a particularized means of challenging the price controls thus narrowing the rights
grudgingly conferred by the statute. Id.
336
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
337
Professor Eisenberg makes a similar argument, but he mistakenly locates the power
to create jurisdictional amount limitations in Article III. See Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 516.
He does not indicate which Article III provision grants this power. Id. My view is that the
power to impose amount limitations on lower federal courts more nearly flows from Article
I’s Necessary and Proper Clause than from the Article III power to create lower federal
courts. Amount limitations on the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction may arguably flow
from either the Necessary and Proper Clause or the power to regulate appellate jurisdiction.
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power; it is not destructive as some current jurisdictional power theories teach.
Second, Congress may make exceptions and regulations to the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction. Like the necessary and proper power, this power is limited to
the protection and facilitation of the federal judiciary’s integrity.338 It also allows
Congress to facilitate the enforcement of its own Article I powers.339
The Supreme Court, however, will be required under the self-executing paradigm to repudiate and overrule a broad range of cases and grapple directly with a
proposition the Court has long taken for granted. Typical is the decision in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust.340 The question that gave
rise to the litigation involved whether state authorities could collect unpaid state
taxes from funds held in trust under an ERISA-covered vacation benefit plan.341 The
Supreme Court did not answer that question, however. Instead, in a unanimous
opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court held there was no federal question
jurisdiction.342 In the Court’s view, whether a case arises under federal law is not
simply a matter of asking what Article III means, but rather, the Court must ask what
Congress thinks (and did), because whether a case arises under federal law implicates federalism concerns as well as the “proper management of the federal judicial
system.”343 Conceding in a footnote that the legislative history does not support a
construction of the statutory language that is narrower than the constitutional “arising
under” language,344 Justice Brennan nonetheless reiterated the view that the meaning
of § 1331 differs from that of the Constitution.
Cases like Pennsylvania v. Union Gas and Franchise Tax Board epitomize how
deeply embedded the current orthodoxy is. The self-executing thesis will therefore
run up against more than a century of stare decisis. Stare decisis, however, “is not an
inexorable command,”345 and the argument in favor of adhering to precedent is
unsound when the foundation of current doctrine rests on a fundamentally mistaken
historical view.
***
Congress’s supposed power to control the lower federal courts’ “arising under”
jurisdiction is a presumption that arose some time after the ratification of the
338

See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 331 (1819).
340
463 U.S. 1 (1983).
341
Id. at 3–4.
342
The case was initially filed in state court by Franchise Tax Board (the state agency charged
with enforcement of California’s state income tax laws) but was removed to federal court by the
Trust, which invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (the removal statute). Whether that removal was proper
depended on whether the case fell within general federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 7, 19 n.18.
343
Id. at 8.
344
Id. at 8–9 n.8.
345
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
339
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Constitution. That presumption is supported by neither the language of the Framers,
the language of the text, nor the historical context in which Article III emerged. That
this presumption has acquired its status as a truism owes more to accident than to
reason or analysis.
Once the layers of this historically anomalous accretion are pulled back, a different
and sounder conclusion emerges: The “arising under” jurisdictional grant flows directly from the Constitution to the federal judiciary. It does not need Congress to act
as an intermediary. The operative scope of this constitutionally conferred jurisdiction,
moreover, is to be interpreted by the federal courts, not Congress. The self-executing
theory best comports with the preponderance of the historical evidence, including
especially the Framers’ desire for an independent judiciary that would protect the
supremacy of federal law. Only by interpreting Article III as conferring self-executing
jurisdiction to the federal judiciary is the balance envisioned by the Framers achieved.
Congress will not become impotent under the model. It will continue to possess
a variety of powers enabling the legislative branch to check the federal courts, including the Senate’s confirmation power, the power to create or eliminate lower federal courts, and the ability to manipulate the “case” limitation on federal courts. Even
with self-executing jurisdiction, the courts will remain the least dangerous branch.
But they will possess the power the Framers intended, and they will be authorized
to exercise that power regardless of congressional action.

